Talent Hoarding in Organizations (Thursday 12:30 -13:30)
Title: Talent Hoarding in Organizations
Abstract: Most organizations rely on managers to identify talented workers. However, because managers are evaluated on team performance, they have an incentive to hoard talented workers, thus jeopardizing the efficient allocation of talent within firms. This study documents talent hoarding using the universe of application and hiring decisions at a large manufacturing firm. When managers rotate to a new position and temporarily stop hoarding talent, workers’ applications for promotions increase by 128%. Marginal applicants, who would not have applied in the absence of manager rotations, are three times as likely average applicants to land a promotion, and perform well in higher-level positions. By reducing the quality and performance of promoted workers, talent hoarding causes misallocation of talent within the firm. Female workers react more to managerial talent hoarding than their male counterparts, meaning that talent hoarding perpetuates gender inequality in representation and pay at the firm.
Organization of the seminar:
- This seminar is planned as face-to-face event at the Frankfurt School.
- The 3G rule applies to participation in the seminar, i.e. you can only take part in person, if you are either vaccinated, tested or recovered from Covid. Please carry the respective certificate with you.
- There is a general obligation to wear medical masks in the buildings of Frankfurt School and Goethe University. The obligation to wear medical masks may be omitted based on a distance and hygiene concept after reaching a seat.
- Detailed information will follow in the invitation email