New publication in The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization: "Incentives to Discover Talent


Incentives to Discover Talent, Tobias Brünner, Guido Friebel, Richard Holden, Suraj Prasad, 2021,
The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, [published: 01 July 2021]

Abstract: We study an agent’s incentives to discover where her talents lie before putting them to productive use. In our setting, an agent can specialize and learn about the same type of talent repeatedly, or experiment and learn about different types of talent. While experimentation is efficient for a range of distributions of talent and initial signals, labor-market institutions play a crucial role for individual incentives to experiment. Institutions that give the agent sufficiently large bargaining power, provide incentives for experimentation, but for weak bargaining power, agents specialize. We also look at how competition in the labor market, human capital accumulation, and correlation across talents affect incentives to experiment. (JEL codes: D83; J24; J42)

Link zur Publikation