Online Shopping and Platform Design with Ex Ante Registration Requirements

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1. Introduction

In online markets, the interactions between firms and consumers exhibit many new characteristics that are not present in traditional shopping at brick and mortar stores. This raises new questions concerning firms’ platform design. In particular, whereas traditional shopping typically does not require consumers to reveal personal information, shopping online often requires creating a user account and entering detailed contact and payment information. Therefore, shopping online can involve costs caused by privacy and security concerns that are less important in traditional markets. 1

This paper considers firms’ platform choices when buying involves a nonmonetary cost for consumers which we call a “cost of registration.” In our model, a firm selling a product online faces a mass of consumers who are ex ante uncertain about the price and characteristics of the product. The firm can credibly reveal this information to the consumers (for instance, by providing a preview of a song or book or by releasing various product photos and details). The platform choice we are interested in is whether to make the information accessible to consumers upon visiting the online shop, or to require the consumers to set up an account before they can learn all relevant product details and, hence, their valuation. In other words, the firm decides whether to require ex ante registration, in which case each consumer who registers incurs a nonmonetary registration cost (independently of buying) or to require registration only ex post (only if the consumer actually wants to buy). Moreover, the firm can offer the option of guest checkout, in which case the consumers need to provide less personal information. There are many examples in which firms require some kind of “registration” before consumers obtain all relevant information. Shopping at iTunes, for instance, requires the download and installation of the software, together with the setup of a user account. 2 The same is true for many music and video streaming services such as Spotify or Netflix for which consumers can only browse the catalog of available titles when having created a user account and, in some cases, installed a software or app; here, consumers are often offered a free trial period in which they can learn their valuation before deciding whether to buy (that is, not to terminate their subscription). Moreover, directing consumers on mobile devices to the respective app stores and making them install the app on their device and set up an account has become increasingly popular. 3

Abstract. We study platform design in online markets in which buying involves a (non-monetary) cost for consumers caused by privacy and security concerns. Firms decide whether to require registration at their website before consumers learn relevant product information. We derive conditions under which a monopoly seller benefits from ex ante registration requirements and demonstrate that the profitability of registration requirements is increased when taking into account the prospect of future purchases or an informational value of consumer registration to the firm. Moreover, we consider the effectiveness of discounts (store credit) as a means to influence the consumers’ registration decision. Finally, we confirm the profitability of ex ante registration requirements in the presence of price competition.

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Other online stores offer certain features of their website only after registration and for users signed in to the website. Sometimes, detailed delivery information and services and total costs (including shipping fees and/or credit card fees) are only disclosed after signing in and at the very end of the checkout process.

The nonmonetary registration costs may deter consumers from buying. We show in a baseline model (Section 3) that it can be profitable for firms to detach the registration costs from the actual buying decision and shift them forward in the shopping process. Thereby the registration costs are already sunk at the point in time where the consumer decides whether to buy and do not matter for the purchase decision anymore. Thus, with an ex ante registration policy, the firm can sell its product to a larger share of consumers and at a higher price, compared to the case without ex ante registration requirement where all information is released immediately and the cost of registration is only incurred by consumers who finally buy.

In Sections 4–6 we consider further specific features of online shopping and analyze how they affect the profitability of registration requirements. Section 4 shows that the prospect of future purchases strengthens both the consumers’ willingness to set up an account and the firm’s advantage of registration requirements; it also demonstrates interesting trade-offs when allowing the option of guest checkout. Section 5 takes into account that firms may value the information that consumers provide when setting up an account and making their buying decision. In this case, equilibrium prices are reduced (consumers “pay” with their information) and the relative profitability of registration requirements is increased; we also address the welfare consequences of registration requirements. Section 6 considers discount policies as a means to increase consumers’ incentives to register. For example, Google recently offered a $25 Google Play credit for its Play Store to consumers “who have, or add, a valid form of payment to your Google Wallet account.” Such a discount increases a consumer’s surplus from registration as long as it is not offered to all registered consumers (otherwise, the equilibrium price increases by the discount, which consumers anticipate). We show that even though discounts distort the firm’s pricing decision, discount policies can make ex ante registration requirements more profitable for the firm.

Finally, the online appendix (available as supplemental material at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2595) studies optimal platform design under competition, assuming that each firm has loyal consumers who only consider buying at this particular firm. The mass of loyal consumers can be arbitrarily small. We show that in any equilibrium where firms do not randomize their registration requirements, all firms, except possibly one, require ex ante registration. Intuitively, ex ante registration requirements are a means to avoid fierce price competition and yield higher profits at least from selling to the loyal consumers (due to the same “sunk cost” advantage as in the benchmark model).

2. Related Literature

Our paper contributes to the literature on Internet markets surveyed by Bakos (2001), Ellison and Ellison (2005), and Levin (2013). Privacy and security concerns have, so far, received only little attention in the literature on market structures and platform design. Lambrecht et al. (2014) emphasize the value of user information in their discussion of different business strategies in the context of digital goods. Our analysis of how the value of user information affects registration policies (in Section 5) is closely related to Akçura and Srinivasan (2005). Bergemann and Bonatti (2013) consider the demand for information and pricing decisions of data providers (who collect data, for instance, via third-party cookies). Chellappa and Shivendu (2010) analyze the economics of personalization for free goods and services when consumers have privacy concerns.

Goldfarb and Tucker (2012) empirically investigate consumers’ privacy concerns and document an increasing trend to refuse the revelation of information as well as clear differences between age cohorts. According to surveys by the Pew Research Center, 91% of American adults agree that consumers have lost control over the collection and use of private information; at the same time, 61% say that they would like to do more to protect their privacy (Rainie et al. 2013, Madden 2014). Moreover, 21% of Internet users reported that they had an e-mail or social networking account compromised or taken over and 11% had important information stolen (such as Social Security number or credit card information). For recent reviews of the economics of privacy, see Acquisti et al. (2015, 2016).

Methodologically, the registration costs considered in our model share some similarities with other purchase-related costs, such as transportation costs, search costs, and set-up or switching costs. It is well known that even arbitrarily small search costs can lead to equilibrium prices that drastically differ from the marginal cost pricing obtained under perfect competition (Diamond 1971). We derive a related result in the presence of arbitrarily small registration costs,
but the logic differs in subtle respects because our result also requires the presence of an arbitrarily small mass of loyal customers (see Section B of the online appendix).\textsuperscript{12}

Moreover, in our baseline model, ex ante registration requirements can be seen as a light form of “bait-and-switch” strategies that are used to increase the share of consumers who visit the store and who, once they are there, are more willing to buy (Gerstner and Hess 1990, Lazear 1995). Anderson and Renault (2006, 2013) analyze a related effect in a search cost model in which a monopoly firm can advertise price and/or match information before the consumer decides whether to visit the store. Koessler and Renault (2012) derive conditions for full disclosure of product and match information for the case of a monopoly firm that can commit to an observable price. Moreover, a recent literature considers firms’ incentives to use “obfuscation strategies” to make it more difficult to compare products and prices (Ellison and Ellison 2009, Carlin 2009, Wilson 2010, Ellison and Wolitzky 2012). Such obfuscation may be particularly relevant in online markets where search costs are low and the price elasticity of demand is high. The literature on switching costs as another prominent type of purchase-related costs has been surveyed by Chen and Hitt (2006) and Farrell and Klemperer (2007). Although the effect of registration requirements in our baseline model shares some similarities with effects identified in the literature on purchase-related costs, there are also fundamental differences from other types of purchase-related costs that become most visible when we extend the baseline model as to analyze the interactions of registration requirements with specific features of online markets.\textsuperscript{13}

\section{3. The Logic of Ex Ante Registration Requirements}

In this section we demonstrate why firms can benefit from making their customers register early: Ex ante registration requirements detach any (nonmonetary) cost of registration/buying from the actual buying decision; this increases a firm’s profit whenever some information about product characteristics and prices is only revealed during the process of shopping. We first show this “sunk cost” effect in a baseline one-period model in which any other motivations for requiring ex ante registration are absent.

Suppose there is one firm and a mass of consumers of size one. The firm offers a product to the consumers; without loss of generality we assume the marginal production cost to be zero. Each consumer has single unit demand. Denote a consumer’s valuation of the good by \(\theta\). It is commonly known that the valuations are independent draws from a cumulative distribution function \(F\) with support \([0, \infty)\); we assume that \(F\) is twice differentiable.

Initially, consumers do not know their valuation; they can inspect the product and learn their \(\theta\) prior to the purchase decision. In order to purchase the product, a buyer needs to provide personal information such as payment and address details, which causes a nonmonetary cost \(k > 0\). This cost comprises the opportunity cost of the time needed to set up an account and the disutility due to privacy and security concerns; it depends on the firm’s registration requirements, as explained next.

The firm makes a platform choice consisting of a decision \(r \in \{ExA, ExP, G\}\) on the registration requirement and chooses a price \(p\) (per unit of the product).\textsuperscript{14}

If the firm requires ex ante registration \((r = ExA)\), then in order to learn his valuation and to observe the price, a consumer has to register and incur a registration cost \(k_\text{R} > 0\). If the firm requires registration only ex post \((r = ExP)\), then consumers learn their valuation and the price without having to register. Consumers who want to buy have to set up an account at the firm; hence, the cost \(k_\text{R}\) is incurred if and only if a consumer decides to buy. As an additional option, the firm can allow guest checkout: if \(r = G\), consumers learn their valuation and the price without having to register. If a consumer wants to buy, he can either set up an account (at cost \(k_\text{R}\)) or use the option of guest checkout, which causes a nonmonetary cost \(k_\text{G}\) where \(0 < k_\text{G} < k_\text{R}\). The nonmonetary cost \(k_\text{G}\) of using guest checkout is strictly lower than the registration cost \(k_\text{R}\) because consumers have to provide less information and privacy concerns are less important. But \(k_\text{G}\) is strictly positive: Even the use of guest checkout requires the provision of some personal information such as shipping and payment details as well as an e-mail address and does not completely eliminate all security concerns. We will see that since \(k_\text{G} < k_\text{R}\) offering guest checkout dominates requiring ex post registration in the benchmark model of this section. Ex post registration requirements can become optimal, however, when considering dynamic aspects (Section 4) or an informational value of consumer registration (Section 5), and interesting trade-offs between allowing guest checkout and requiring registration ex post arise in these settings.

The timing of the game is as follows. At the beginning of stage 1, nature draws each consumer’s valuation \(\theta\) independently from the distribution \(F\) (neither consumers nor the firm observe these draws of \(\theta\)). Next, the firm decides on the registration requirement and this platform choice becomes common knowledge. In stage 2, the firm chooses a price \(p \geq 0\). The sequence of events in stage 3 depends on whether or not the firm has chosen to require ex ante registration. If \(r = ExA\), then in stage 3 each buyer decides whether to register at cost \(k_\text{R} > 0\). Registered consumers can observe the price \(p\) and their valuation \(\theta\) and decide if they
want to buy one unit of the good; nonregistered consumers cannot buy. If \( r \neq ExA \), all consumers observe \( p \) and their \( \theta \) and then decide whether or not to buy. If \( r = ExP \), a consumer who wants to buy has to set up an account at cost \( k_R > 0 \); if \( r = G \), consumers can choose between setting up an account (at cost \( k_R \)) and buying as a guest (at cost \( k_C \)).

The firm’s profit is equal to the share of consumers who buy, multiplied by the price \( p \). A buyer’s utility is equal to (i) \( −k_R \) if he registers but does not buy, (ii) \( \theta − p − k_R \) if he buys with an account, (iii) \( \theta − p − k_C \) if he buys as guest, and (iv) zero otherwise. We assume the tie-breaking rules that indifferent consumers set up an account and buy when indifferent between buying and not buying. Moreover, unless explicitly noted otherwise, we break ties between \( k_R \) and \( k_C \) in favor of \( r = ExA \) and ties between \( r = ExP \) and \( r = G \) in favor of \( r = ExP \). The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

Before turning to the equilibrium of the game, we pause to discuss the informational aspects and an alternative interpretation of the setup. The model assumes that with an ex ante registration requirement, consumers cannot learn their valuation without setting up an account. In reality, for some types of products it may be difficult for firms to “hide” the relevant product characteristics. For example, the consumer may learn about the search qualities (Nelson 1974) of the product from reviews or discussion boards. We point out, however, that the information obtained in this way will typically not be complete. In particular, in order to find out how much he values the experience qualities of the good, a consumer will have to inspect the product (or a sample thereof) himself, and no other channels can reliably transmit all of the relevant information. Our model applies whenever some information provision remains under the control of the seller (for example, Netflix and Spotify control when to divulge lists of movies and songs, respectively). Formally, the cumulative distribution function \( F \) captures the residual uncertainty. Moreover, obtaining information from sources other than the seller is not costless for the consumers; we determine a consumer’s maximum willingness to pay for such information below.

Apart from unit demand for one product, the model reflects markets such as music or video streaming services with a continuum of goods. The price \( p \) can be interpreted as the price for a subscription and \( \theta \) as a measure for the share of goods a consumer likes where he derives a utility of one if he likes the good and zero utility otherwise; hence, \( \theta \) is equal to the expected utility from subscribing.

**No Ex Ante Registration.** Suppose that the firm does not require ex ante registration; then in stage 3, each buyer learns the price \( p \) and his valuation \( \theta \). For a nonmonetary cost of buying \( k \) (where \( k \in \{k_G, k_R\} \)), the share of consumers who buy is equal to

\[
\Pr(\theta \geq p + k) = 1 - F(p + k).
\]

In stage 2, the firm anticipates the consumers’ buying decisions and chooses a price \( p \) as the solution to

\[
\max_p (1 - F(p + k))p.
\]

Define \( p(k) \) as the solution to\(^{15}\)

\[
p(k) = \frac{1 - F(p(k) + k)}{F'(p(k) + k)},
\]

and the corresponding profit \( \pi(k) \) as

\[
\pi(k) := (1 - F(p(k) + k))p(k).
\]

If the firm chooses \( r = G \) and a price \( p \), all consumers who want to buy will use the guest checkout (due to \( k_G < k_R \)). Hence, the firm’s optimal price is \( p(k_G) \), with a corresponding profit of \( \pi(k_G) \). If instead \( r = ExP \), then all consumers who want to buy have to register at cost \( k_R \), which yields an optimal price of \( p(k_R) \) and a corresponding profit of \( \pi(k_R) \). With

\[
\bar{u}(k) := \int_{\theta \leq k} (\theta - p(k) - k) dF(\theta),
\]

expected consumer surplus is equal to \( \bar{u}(k_G) \) if \( r = G \) and equal to \( \bar{u}(k_R) \) if \( r = ExP \).

**Ex Ante Registration.** Suppose that the firm requires ex ante registration; then in stage 3, only registered consumers learn \( p \) and their \( \theta \). A (registered) consumer buys if and only if \( \theta \geq p \).

If a buyer knew the price \( p \) (but not yet his valuation \( \theta \)), he would register if and only if his expected utility from registration is sufficient to cover the registration cost; that is,

\[
\int_{p}^{\infty} (\theta - p) dF(\theta) \geq k_R.
\]

The buyers, however, do not know the price when deciding on registration. They therefore have to form beliefs about the price set by the firm. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, these beliefs must be consistent with the firm’s price setting behavior and derived from Bayes’ rule wherever possible. Consider the firm’s pricing decision. Suppose that the firm believes that all buyers register, then the firm chooses a price as the solution to

\[
\max_p (1 - F(p))p.
\]

This yields an optimal price equal to \( p(0) \) and a corresponding profit of \( \pi(0) \) (where \( p(k) \) and \( \pi(k) \) are...
defined in (1) and (2), respectively). Anticipating this price, a buyer registers if and only if \( k_R \leq \bar{u}(0) \), where

\[
\bar{u}(0) = \int_{p_0}^{\infty} (\theta - p(\theta)) \, dF(\theta).
\]

(5)

Therefore, if \( k_R \leq \bar{u}(0) \), the continuation game has an equilibrium in which the firm chooses \( p = p(0) \); all buyers register, and they buy if and only if \( \theta \geq p(0) \). If instead \( k_R > \bar{u}(0) \), then in the equilibrium of the continuation game no buyer registers. To see why, suppose that, in stage 3, a buyer registers with some probability \( \mu \in (0, 1] \). Anticipating this registration decision, the firm will choose the price \( p(0) \). But if a buyer’s beliefs about the price \( p \) are consistent with this choice, it is optimal for the buyer not to register in case of \( k_R > \bar{u}(0) \); anticipating the firm’s choice of the price, the expected surplus from registration is too low. Comparing the firm’s expected profits under the different registration requirements yields our first main result.

**Proposition 1.** In equilibrium, a monopoly firm requires ex ante registration if and only if \( k_R \leq \bar{u}(0) \) (where \( \bar{u}(0) \) is given in (5)). Otherwise, the firm chooses \( r = G \) and offers the option of guest checkout.

**Proof.** Suppose that \( k_R \leq \bar{u}(0) \). If the firm requires ex ante registration, it chooses the price \( p(0) \). Since all consumers register, the firm’s expected profit is

\[
\pi(0) = (1 - F(p(0)))p(0),
\]

which is (weakly) larger than \((1 - F(p))p\) for all \( p \neq p(0) \).

In particular, for any \( k > 0 \),

\[
\pi(0) \geq (1 - F(p(k) + k))(p(k) + k) > (1 - F(p(k) + k))p(k) = \pi(k).
\]

Hence, the firm’s profit under \( r = EA \) is strictly higher than (i) its profit under \( r = EXP \) (which is \( \pi(k_R) \)) and (ii) its profit under \( r = G \) (which is \( \pi(k_C) \)).

If \( k_R > \bar{u}(0) \), the firm makes zero profits if it requires ex ante registration but strictly positive profits if it does not require ex ante registration. Under \( r = G \), it chooses \( p = p(k_C) \) and must be (weakly) better off than when choosing \( p' = p(k_R) + k_R - k_C \); thus,

\[
\pi(k_C) \geq (1 - F(p(k_C) + k_R - k_C))(p(k_C) + k_R - k_C) > (1 - F(p(k_R) + k_R))p(k_R) = \pi(k_R).
\]

The intuition for Proposition 1 is straightforward. If the consumers’ costs of registration are sufficiently small \((k_R \leq \bar{u}(0))\), consumers are willing to register ex ante. In this case, requiring ex ante registration is optimal for the firm. With ex ante registration, the registration costs \( k_R \) are sunk when a consumer decides whether to purchase; ex ante registration detaches the registration costs from the purchase decision. Consequently, with ex ante registration, the firm can choose a higher price and still sell to a larger share of consumers. If, however, the consumers’ registration costs are high relative to the expected consumer surplus, no one would be willing to register ex ante; therefore, the firm does not require it. In the latter case, the firm prefers \( r = G \) over \( r = EXP \) since, for any given price, more consumers buy if less personal information is required (formally, this follows from \( k_C < k_R \)).

To gain a better understanding of pricing decisions and consumer surplus, we make the following assumption on the probability distribution \( F \).

**Assumption 1.** \( F \) has a strictly monotone hazard rate:

\[
\frac{d}{d\theta} \frac{F'(\theta)}{1 - F(\theta)} > 0.
\]

Assumption 1 implies the following ranking of the candidate equilibrium prices:

\[
p(k_R) < p(k_C) < p(0) < p(k_C) + k_C < p(k_R) + k_C.
\]

The higher the consumers’ registration costs \( k \), the lower is the price \( p(k) \) that the firm charges. But the sum of the price and the registration cost, \( p(k) + k \), is increasing in \( k \), which implies that higher registration costs reduce the equilibrium probability of trade. Therefore, if the firm requires ex ante registration, its equilibrium price is higher \((p(0) > p(k) \text{ for all } k > 0)\); nevertheless, its demand goes up \((1 - F(p(0)) > 1 - F(p(k)) \text{ for all } k > 0)\). Each of these two effects makes the firm benefit from shifting the registration cost to the ex ante stage. The effect of ex ante registration on consumer surplus is, however, exactly the opposite. With ex ante registration, the consumers pay a higher price; in addition, they pay \( k_R \) independently of whether they buy. Both effects reduce consumer surplus compared to the case of no ex ante registration and cause consumer surplus to be highest when the firm offers the option of guest checkout \((r = G)\).

Defining welfare as the sum of the firm’s expected profits and the consumers’ expected utility, the effect of an ex ante registration requirement on welfare can be separated into two effects: (i) changes in the surplus from trade caused by changes in the equilibrium price and (ii) changes in the total expected nonmonetary cost of registration. The second effect is always welfare-reducing since \( k_R > k_C \) and since under ex ante registration requirements the cost of registration is incurred independently of whether a consumer actually buys. The first effect can, however, be positive: if Assumption 1 holds, there is more trade with ex ante registration requirements, which is welfare improving since there is inefficiently low trade in equilibrium. If \( F \) is a uniform distribution, for instance, the total welfare effect of ex ante registration requirements is negative even when \( k_R \rightarrow k_C \) (the second, negative effect...
outweighs the first, positive effect). But there are also examples for distributions \( F \) for which welfare is higher with than without ex ante registration.\(^{20}\)

To conclude this section we discuss the informational assumptions of the model, effects of price competition, and a possible heterogeneity in consumers' privacy concerns.

**Registration Requirements, Information Provision, and Consumer Search.** As discussed above, with an ex ante registration requirement, consumers may try to obtain relevant information through other channels such as product reviews or discussion forums. Searching for information is likely to be time consuming or costly in other ways, however. If \( k_R \leq \bar{u}(0) \) and \( r = \text{ExA} \), a consumer is willing to invest search effort up to

\[
\int_{p(0)+k_R}^{\infty} (\theta - p(0) - k_R) dF(\theta) - (\bar{u}(0) - k_R)
= F(p(0)k_R + \int_{p(0)}^{\infty} (p(0) + k_R - \theta) dF(\theta) \quad (6)
\]

to learn \( \theta \) and \( p \). This amount is strictly positive because the information acquisition allows the consumer to avoid (i) the registration costs when not buying (the first term in (6)) and (ii) buying at a total (monetary and registration) cost higher than \( \theta \) (the second term in (6)). The firm can keep using ex ante registration requirements whenever the consumers’ costs of learning the information through other channels are larger than the amount in (6).

Search costs are likely to be high for experience and inspection goods, where learning one’s valuation essentially requires trying out the good or a sample of it, and for specialized goods and services for which only a few other buyers exist from whom one could gather relevant information. On the other hand, for highly standardized mass products with mainly search characteristics that can easily be communicated by other customers, search costs are likely to be low, and hence ex ante registration policies may be undermined by consumers’ search behavior. In this case, the firm would be willing to pay up to its profit increase under ex ante registration, \( \pi(0) - \pi(\hat{k}_C) \), in order to implement “obfuscation strategies” that raise the consumers’ search costs above the amount in (6).\(^{21}\)

Our model also abstracted away from any direct costs of the firm to provide information to consumers such as offering product samples or designing the website accordingly. Moreover, registration often includes installing some software or app, in which case providing product information to nonregistered consumers may be more costly for the firm. A lower cost of information provision to registered as compared to nonregistered consumers would make ex ante registration requirements relatively more profitable.

A related issue is the credibility of the information provided by the firm. For experience qualities, the main uncertainty is about the match between the product and the consumer’s idiosyncratic tastes; the firm may be unable to directly communicate anything about the match but needs to let the consumers inspect or try out the product, for instance, through book previews, song samples, or free trial memberships. Here, credibility is less an issue because providing information means letting consumers test (aspects of) the product itself. Conversely, credibility may be more of a concern with respect to search qualities. Any issue of credibility of the firm’s information provision will arise in all types of registration policies discussed above and is therefore orthogonal to our main research objective.

Finally, the analysis above assumes that in case of an ex ante registration requirement, the price is only revealed upon registration. This assumption is most restrictive for making ex ante registration profitable since a firm that requires ex ante registration cannot commit to a lower price but will always choose \( p = p(0) \) in equilibrium, which the consumers anticipate. If \( k_R \leq \bar{u}(0) \), this assumption is inconsequential since with price commitment the firm chooses the same price \( p(0) \) such that our results are unaffected. If \( k_R > \bar{u}(0) \), however, ex ante registration requirements are infeasible without price commitment. In contrast, when the firm can commit to a price, ex ante registration requirements can still be profitable.

To formalize this argument suppose that the consumers learn the price set by the firm prior to registration, even if the firm requires ex ante registration. Moreover, suppose that the price chosen by the firm is a binding commitment and cannot be changed once consumers have registered. Arguably, this fits some of the examples mentioned in the introduction. For example, the prices of the streaming services of Netflix and Spotify can be found on their websites, and reputational concerns may make it costly for firms to deviate from these prices.

**Remark 1.** With price commitment, a monopoly firm requires ex ante registration if and only if \( k_R \leq \hat{k}_R \), where \( \tilde{u}(0) < \hat{k}_R < E(\theta) \). Otherwise, the firm chooses \( r = G \) and offers the option of guest checkout.

The proofs of Remark 1 and subsequent results are relegated to the appendix. Comparing Remark 1 with Proposition 1 shows that the possibility of price commitment enlarges the range of parameters where the firm requires ex ante registration. For \( k_R \leq \bar{u}(0) \), the optimal price and expected profits are the same with and without the possibility of price commitment. But if \( k_R \) is in some environment above \( \bar{u}(0) \) then, by committing to a price slightly below \( p(0) \), the firm can guarantee that the consumers register ex ante. Therefore, if \( k_R \) is in the (nonempty) interval \( (\bar{u}(0), \hat{k}_R) \), the optimal
registration choice is \( r = \text{ExA} \) in the case with price commitment, but it is \( r = G \) in the case without ex ante observability of prices. Another way of enlarging the range of registration costs for which consumers register is the use of discounts (store credit); in Section 6 we demonstrate the effectiveness of such discounts when commitment on prices is not possible.

**Competition.** The benchmark model above assumed a monopoly seller, and this naturally raises the question of how robust the results are with respect to competition. Indeed, under Assumption 1 consumer surplus is lowest in case of an ex ante registration requirement; hence, the consumers may prefer to shop at a firm that does not require ex ante registration. Therefore, we also study price competition between \( N \geq 2 \) firms (see Section B of the online appendix), assuming that each firm may have a share \( \beta \geq 0 \) of “loyal” consumers who only consider buying at this particular firm, whereas the remaining share \( 1 - \beta N \) of “noncommitted” consumers can buy at any firm.\(^{22}\) We show that ex ante registration requirements are prevalent: whenever \( \beta > 0 \), all firms, except possibly one, will require ex ante registration and charge prices equal to \( p(0) \), in any equilibrium where firms do not randomize their platform choices. Even though a firm \( i \) with \( r_i = \text{ExA} \) attracts the noncommitted consumers, the threat of price competition prevents a second firm \( j \) from choosing \( r_j \neq \text{ExA} \). In the latter case \( j \) may get (some of) the noncommitted consumers but realizes a lower profit from selling to its loyal consumers; such a deviation turns out to be never profitable, even for arbitrarily small \( \beta \). By a similar argument, if the share of loyal consumers is sufficiently high, all firms require ex ante registration in equilibrium and charge prices equal to the monopoly price.

The high prices chosen in equilibrium are reminiscent of the Diamond (1971) paradox that arbitrarily small search costs can yield prices equal to the monopoly price. Our assumption that prices are unobservable contributes to a related finding: if all firms choose \( r_i = \text{ExA} \), the noncommitted consumers expect all firms to choose \( p = p(0) \); thus, with arbitrarily small registration costs \( k_R \), they register at one random firm. In turn, the firms have no incentive to lower their prices. If, instead, the firms can commit to prices ex ante (compare the discussion above), this leads to prices below the monopoly price even in case all firms choose \( r_i = \text{ExA} \). However, the result that all firms, except possibly one, require ex ante registration in equilibrium continues to hold in case of observable prices (details are in Section D of the online appendix). The sunk cost advantage of ex ante registration requirements is sufficiently strong to make \( r_i = \text{ExA} \) attractive even in the absence of “price obfuscation.” Moreover, just as in the monopoly case, the ability to commit to prices enlarges the range of registration costs \( k_R \) for which ex ante registration requirements are profitable.

**Heterogeneity in Registration Costs.** Although the profitability of ex ante registration requirements is most visible in the case where all consumers face the same registration cost \( k_R \), it carries over to situations in which there is heterogeneity in the consumers’ registration costs. We briefly discuss how the main proposition of this section changes if consumers differ in their cost of registration, for instance, because some consumers care more about privacy than others. For this purpose, suppose that a consumer’s costs of registration \( k_R \) and \( k_G \) are drawn from two probability distributions \( H_R(k_R) \) and \( H_G(k_G) \), respectively, with support \([0, \infty)\). The cost parameters \( k_R \) and \( k_G \) can be correlated \( (H_R \text{ and } H_G \text{ should be interpreted as the marginal distributions of the joint distribution of } (k_R, k_G)) \). We assume that \( k_R \geq k_G \) for each consumer, with strict inequality for a positive mass of consumers. Moreover, we assume \( k_R \) and \( k_G \) to be independent of the valuation \( \theta \) so that under \( r = \text{ExA} \) a consumer’s choice to register does not convey information about his valuation \( \theta \). Each consumer privately knows his registration costs \( k_R \) and \( k_G \).

**Remark 2.** If the consumers’ costs of registration \( k_R \) and \( k_G \) are distributed according to \( H_R(k_R) \) and \( H_G(k_G) \), respectively, the firm requires ex ante registration if and only if

\[
H_R(\bar{u}(0)) \geq \frac{\tilde{\pi}_G}{\pi(0)} \in (0, 1), \quad (7)
\]

where

\[
\tilde{\pi}_G := \max_{p} \int_{0}^{\infty} (1 - F(p + k_G))p dH_G(k_G).
\]

Otherwise, the firm offers the option of guest checkout \( (r = G) \).

If the consumers differ in their costs of registration, the firm faces a trade-off when choosing its registration policy: in case of \( r = \text{ExA} \), only the consumers with low \( k_R \) will register and possibly buy, whereas under \( r = G \) demand may be increased. But the profit extracted from those consumers who register under \( r = \text{ExA} \) is higher than under \( r \neq \text{ExA} \) (as shown in Proposition 1). Therefore, if a sufficiently high share of consumers have registration costs \( k_R \) below \( \bar{u}(0) \) and are willing to register, the firm requires ex ante registration, accepting that it will not sell to some consumers who have a high cost of registration. Here, the additional gain from selling to consumers who register (those with low \( k_R \)) outweighs the loss from not selling at all to some other consumers (those with high \( k_R \)). If, however, the share of consumers with high \( k_R \) is increased, then the firm is better off by not requiring ex ante registration and offering the option of guest checkout.

Formally, the left-hand side of (7) determines the share of consumers who register under \( r = \text{ExA} \), and
the right-hand side of (7) relates the profits per registered consumer under \( r = ExA \) (which still is \( \pi(0) \)) to the profit per consumer under \( r = G \) (which now is \( \bar{R} \)). In case of identical registration costs \( k_r \) (as assumed in our baseline model), the left-hand side of (7) is equal to one if \( k_r \leq \bar{u}(0) \) and zero otherwise; in this case, (7) holds if and only if \( k_r \leq \bar{u}(0) \) (compare the condition in Proposition 1).

4. A Dynamic Perspective

This section analyzes how the monopoly firm’s choice of its registration policy is affected by aspects of future purchases. We first show that consumers expect a higher future surplus in case they already have an account at the firm and do not need to register again when buying; this increases the range of registration costs for which ex ante registration requirements are optimal. Second, we consider the firm’s decision whether to offer the option of guest checkout in situations in which ex ante registration requirements are not feasible, either because the consumers’ cost of registration is high or because the consumers can learn their valuation through other channels at comparably low cost (compare the discussion in Section 3). Here, we show that the firm may prefer to require registration ex post (instead of offering guest checkout). This result is again due to a sunk cost advantage when selling in future periods to consumers who are already registered.

Suppose there are two periods, \( t \) and \( t + 1 \). Each consumer has unit demand in each period; his valuations in the two periods are denoted by \( \theta_t \) and \( \theta_{t+1} \) and are independent draws from the probability distribution \( F_t \). The sequence of actions within period \( \tau \in \{t, t+1\} \) is as in the baseline model. At the beginning of each period \( \tau \in \{t, t+1\} \), the firm chooses its registration requirement \( r_{\tau} \) as well as its price policy. The choice \( r_{\tau} \) determines whether the consumers need a user account in order to observe \( \theta_{\tau} \) and the price in period \( \tau \).

As above, registration involves a cost \( k_r \). Moreover, for each purchase using guest checkout, consumers incur a cost \( k_c \). Consumers who have, in \( t \), set up an account at the firm (at cost \( k_r \)) can, in \( t + 1 \), use their existing account to inform themselves about the product and its price and can also buy, without incurring additional registration costs. Registered consumers can also set up a new account in \( t + 1 \) (again at cost \( k_r \)) or use guest checkout if offered (at cost \( k_c \)) instead of buying with their existing account, but as we will see, they have no incentive to do this since in equilibrium the total costs of buying (the price plus the costs of registration or guest checkout) turn out to be higher than when using the existing account.

We assume that the firm can charge different prices to registered and to nonregistered consumers. More precisely, the firm can condition its price offer in period \( t + 1 \) on a consumer’s registration decision in period \( t \). This assumption simplifies the analysis considerably; it implies that a consumer’s expected future gain from being registered does not depend on the other consumers’ registration choices. The assumption is also reasonable since the consumers identify themselves when visiting the website and deciding to sign in; thus, in order to pursue such a strategy, the firm does not need to know more about the consumers than they reveal themselves. Moreover, charging different prices for “existing” and “new” consumers is a widely established strategy in practice (Caillaud and De Nijs 2014). Finally, we assume in what follows that Assumption 1 holds (\( F \) has a monotone hazard rate).

**Proposition 2.** In the two-period model, the firm requires ex ante registration in period \( t \) if and only if

\[
k_r \leq 2\bar{u}(0) - \bar{u}(k_c).
\]

Proposition 2 confirms that if the firm has the option of using ex ante registration requirements, it prefers to do so as long as the consumers’ costs of registration are sufficiently low. Moreover, the sunk cost effect of ex ante registration benefits the firm not only in the current period but also in future periods, even though registered consumers can observe their valuation and the price in future periods without having to incur any cost.

Including the option of multiple purchases also increases the consumers’ value of registering; if a consumer already has an account, he realizes a higher expected surplus since he does not have to incur again the cost of setting up an account. This holds even though the consumer (correctly) anticipates a higher price if he is registered. Therefore, the range of registration costs for which ex ante registration requirements are profitable for the firm is enlarged compared to the baseline model (Assumption 1 implies that \( \bar{u}(0) > \bar{u}(k_c) \)).

For high registration costs \( k_r \) such that (8) is violated, no consumer would register under \( r_t = ExA \). In this case, the firm is strictly better off by not requiring ex ante registration, and it has to decide whether or not to offer the option of guest checkout. To solve for the firm’s optimal platform choice, we first compare the firm’s per-period expected profits conditional on its platform choice in period \( t \). If the firm chooses \( r_t = G \), the consumers may nevertheless prefer to set up an account when deciding to buy; they prefer buying with an account over buying as a guest if and only if their additional expected future surplus from already having an account \( (\bar{u}(0) - \bar{u}(k_c)) \) is larger than the additional cost of registration \( (k_r - k_c) \). We show in the appendix (see the proof of Lemma 1) that there exists a critical value \( \bar{k}_c = (0, k_r) \) such that, in period \( t \),
consumers prefer guest checkout over setting up an account if and only if \( k_C < \hat{k}_G \). If \( k_C \geq \hat{k}_G \), the option of guest checkout becomes irrelevant (since no consumer uses it) and the firm’s profits are the same under \( r_t = G \) and \( r_t = \text{ExP} \).28

**Lemma 1.** Suppose that (8) is violated and \( k_C < \hat{k}_G \). Denote by \( \pi_{t,r}(r_t = r) \) the firm’s expected profit in period \( \tau \in \{t, t+1\} \) when the registration policy choice in period \( t \) is \( r \in \{\text{ExP}, G\} \). Then (i) \( \pi_{t+1}(r_t = \text{ExP}) > \pi_{t+1}(r_t = G) \) and (ii) \( \pi_t(r_t = \text{ExP}) < \pi_t(r_t = G) \).

The economics behind Lemma 1(i) is closely related to Proposition 1 in Section 3. With the probability that consumers are already registered and, hence, the registration cost is sunk, the firm achieves higher expected profits. For this effect, it is not crucial that the firm requires registration at the beginning of a period, before consumers can observe their valuation and the price. Lemma 1(i) shows that the same result is obtained vis-à-vis future expected profits: The firm benefits from registration requirements since this yields higher profits in future periods when consumers can buy without having to incur the cost of setting up an account. Since the firm’s future profits are increasing in the share of consumers who already have an account, the firm’s optimal price in period \( t \) under \( r_t = \text{ExP} \) is lower than the price \( p(k_C) \) in the baseline model (for details, see the proof of Lemma 1). Of course, requiring registration also affects current expected profits. Lemma 1(ii) demonstrates a counter-vailing effect of ex post registration requirements on the firm’s profits: today’s profits are reduced. Overall, the firm faces a trade-off between lower profits today and higher profits in the future when deciding whether to require ex post registration.

**Proposition 3.** Consider the two-period model and suppose that \( k_R > 2\bar{u}(0) - \bar{u}(k_C) \). There exists a threshold \( \tilde{k}_G \in (0, \hat{k}_G) \) such that the firm offers the option of guest checkout in period \( t \) (\( r_t = G \)) if and only if \( k_C < \tilde{k}_G \). Otherwise, the firm requires ex post registration in period \( t \) such that consumers who buy have to set up an account (\( r_t = \text{ExP} \)).

Proposition 3 states that the firm prefers to make consumers register when they want to buy, unless the advantage of guest checkout in terms of lower transaction costs is sufficiently strong. Formally, if \( k_C \) is much lower than \( k_R \), the cost \( k_C \) of using guest checkout does not play an important role for the consumers’ purchasing decision; hence, the firm is better off by providing this option even though this results in a situation in which no consumer is registered in future periods. But if \( k_C \) is increased and the consumers’ additional cost of setting up an account (compared to using guest checkout) becomes lower, ex post registration becomes relatively more attractive. If \( k_C \) is above a threshold \( \bar{k}_C \in (0, \hat{k}_C) \), the firm is strictly better off when it does not offer the option of guest checkout and forces consumers to set up an account whenever they want to buy. Here, the firm’s gain in future profits from customers who are already registered (as in Lemma 1(i)) is sufficient to outweigh the reduction in today’s profits caused by a lower demand today (as in Lemma 1(ii)). Also note that when \( k_C \in (\hat{k}_C, \bar{k}_G) \), consumers would prefer buying with a guest account, but the firm forces them to register. Figure 1 illustrates the results of Propositions 2 and 3 by showing the firm’s optimal platform choice for parameter combinations \((k_C, \hat{k}_G)\).29

Along with incorporating repeat purchases as a particular feature of online shopping into our analysis, this section also served a theoretical aim. We point out that even when the firm releases all information about current prices and products, consumers will nevertheless face some uncertainty about their future expected surplus from registering (their future product valuations), for instance, because they cannot fully anticipate all technology enhancements and product developments or because of unpredictable fluctuations of future income. In particular for the latter type of uncertainty, it is clear that the firm has no possibility to influence the precision of information that a consumer holds. In this sense, this section also demonstrated that the benefit of registration requirements does not depend on the ability of the firm to “hide” product and price information but emerges whenever consumers are not completely sure about the value they derive from shopping at the firm, in the current period or with respect to future periods.

### 5. Value of Consumer Information

This section considers the firm’s optimal registration policy when consumer registration generates an informational value to the firm, either because the firm can make direct use of the information that consumers...
provide when they register (for instance, when targeting certain types of consumers) or because it sells this information to other firms. We show that the value of user information to the firm adds to, and interacts with, the benefit from ex ante registration requirements identified in the previous sections. Moreover, informational benefits from user registration can provide a rationale for why firms may prefer not to offer the option of guest checkout even when aspects of future purchases are absent.

Consider the baseline model of Section 3 but suppose that in addition to the profit from selling its product, the firm values the information that the consumers provide when registering and/or buying. Specifically, we assume that the firm gets an additional value \( v_R \geq 0 \) from each consumer who sets up an account (independently of the buying decision). In addition, the firm derives an informational value \( v_C \geq 0 \) from each consumer who buys with an account. Finally, the firm gets a informational value \( v_B \geq 0 \) from each consumer who buys as a guest (if this option is offered). We assume that \( v_R + v_B \geq v_C \); that is, the informational gain for the firm is higher if consumers set up an account and buy with their account than if consumers buy using guest checkout since in the former case the firm learns more about the consumers’ preferences together with their personal characteristics.

Taking into account an additional benefit from consumer information changes the firm’s pricing decision. Define by \( p(k,v) \) the solution to the optimization problem

\[
\max_p (1 - F(p + k))(p + v).
\]  

In case of an interior solution, \( p(k,v) \) is given by

\[
p(k,v) = \frac{1 - F(p(k,v) + k)}{F(p(k,v) + k)} - v.
\]  

The solution \( p(k,v) \) is the price that the firm sets if the consumers’ nonmonetary cost of buying is \( k \) and the firm gets an informational benefit \( v \) in case a consumer buys. Hence, if the firm requires ex ante registration, the optimal price is \( p(0,v_R) \); the costs of registration \( k_R \) and the value \( v_R \) from user registration are already “sunk” in this case and not relevant for the firm’s pricing decision. If instead the firm requires registration only ex post, it sets a price \( p(k_R,v_R + v_B) \), taking into account both the registration cost \( k_R \) and the informational benefit \( v_R + v_B \) per purchase with an account.

With Assumption 1 on the probability distribution \( F \), \( p(k,v) \) as given in (10) is strictly decreasing in \( k \) and in \( v \). The informational benefit \( v \) generated if a consumer buys (with an account or as guest) leads to a lower equilibrium price since the firm derives an additional value from increased demand. If the value of user information is very large, the firm does not charge any positive price (or even subsidizes the nonmonetary registration costs) but lets the consumers “pay” through their information provision. The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium registration policy.

**Proposition 4.** (i) Suppose that

\[
k_R \leq \int_{p(0,v_R)}^{\infty} (\theta - p(0,v_B)) dF(\theta); \tag{11}
\]

then the firm requires ex ante registration \( r = \text{ExA} \) in equilibrium.

(ii) Suppose that (11) is violated; then in equilibrium the firm requires ex post registration \( r = \text{ExP} \) if and only if \( v_R + v_B - k_R \geq v_C - k_C \) and offers the option of guest checkout \( r = \text{G} \) otherwise.

Proposition 4 confirms the firm’s incentive to make use of ex ante registration requirements and offers insights into how the informational value of consumer registration interacts with the “sunk cost” advantage of ex ante registration requirements. First, the threshold for \( k_R \) below which the firm requires ex ante registration (the right-hand side of the inequality in (11)) is increasing in the value of consumer information \( v_B \). A higher value of consumer information leads to a lower price and, thus, makes consumers more willing to register ex ante due to the higher surplus they expect (Proposition 4(i)). Second, although ex post registration requirements are never profitable in the baseline model, this changes when the firm values the information that consumers provide when registering. If the consumers are not willing to register ex ante but the informational benefit from consumer registration is sufficiently strong (\( v_R \) and \( v_B \) are large relative to \( v_C \), then the firm is strictly better off when requiring consumers to set up an account ex post, in case they want to buy (Proposition 4(ii)). With a positive value of user information, ex ante registration requirements become relatively more profitable for the firm.

**Remark 3.** The firm’s advantage from requiring ex ante registration as opposed to requiring registration only ex post, or to allowing guest checkout, is larger when the firm derives a value from consumer information (that is, when \( v_B > 0 \) or \( v_R > 0 \) or both, and \( 0 \leq v_C \leq v_R + v_B \)) than in the baseline model (where \( v_B = v_R = v_C = 0 \)).

The higher profitability of ex ante registration requirements \( r = \text{ExA} \) is due to two effects. First, more consumer register in case of \( r = \text{ExA} \) (provided that (11) holds); thus, the advantage of ex ante registration requirements (that is, the difference in profits under \( r = \text{ExA} \) and under \( r = \text{ExP} \) and \( r = \text{G} \), respectively) is increasing in \( v_R \). Second, since ex ante
registration requirements increase the willingness of registered consumers to buy, an informational value $v_b$ attached to the buying decision makes policy $r = ExA$ relatively more profitable. In other words, the sunk cost effect of ex ante registration requirements reinforces the informational value of consumer registration. To see this, suppose that $v_R = 0$. If $k_R \to 0$ then the firm is indifferent between ex ante and ex post registration requirements for all $v_B \geq 0$. If $k_R > 0$, however, the firm is strictly better off by choosing $r = ExA$, for all $v_B \geq 0$, and the advantage of using ex ante registration requirements becomes stronger the higher $v_B$ since more consumers buy under $r = ExA$. An equivalent argument applies to the comparison of $r = ExA$ and $r = G$.33

We now evaluate the equilibrium registration requirement from a welfare perspective. As above, we take welfare to be the sum of consumer surplus and the firm’s profit. The firm’s choice between $r = ExP$ and $r = G$ is fully aligned with consumers’ preferences. To see this, note that problem (9) is formally identical to a standard monopoly problem where a per-unit sales tax $k$ is levied from the consumer and a subsidy $v$ is granted to the firm per unit sold. As in the standard tax incidence result on the irrelevance of statutory incidence for economic incidence, the equilibrium price depends only on the net subsidy, i.e., on the difference between the subsidy and the tax, $v - k$. Moreover, given a pass-through rate between 0 and 100%, the seller’s profit and consumer surplus are both increasing in the net subsidy. Under $r = ExP$, the “net subsidy” is $v_R + v_B - k_R$; under $r = G$, it is $v_G - k_G$. Therefore, both the firm (compare Proposition 4(ii)) and the consumers prefer $ExP$ over $G$ if and only if $v_R + v_B - k_R$ is larger than $v_G - k_G$.

Under the assumptions of Proposition 4(ii), if $r = ExA$, no one registers, and welfare is zero. In contrast, both $r = ExP$ and $r = G$ lead to strictly positive welfare. Together with the considerations of the last paragraph, this implies that the firm’s registration policy is welfare-maximizing when (11) is violated, that is, the firm’s platform choice is either $r = ExP$ or $r = G$. On the other hand, when (11) holds, the firm chooses $r = ExA$ by Proposition 4(i). The consumers, however, always prefer $r = ExP$ over $ExA$ since under $r = ExP$ the price is lower ($p(k_R, v_R + v_B) < p(0, v_B)$) and, moreover, the registration costs are only incurred in case a consumer finally buys. Here, each of the three options $ExA$, $ExP$, and $G$ can be welfare-maximizing under some parameter constellations.34

Summarizing, the only possible inefficiency in the firm’s equilibrium registration requirements can arise when the firm requires ex ante registration; an equilibrium choice of an ex post registration requirement is always efficient. A legal ban on ex ante registration requirements, however, does not unambiguously raise welfare since there are parameter constellations for which $ExA$ is indeed welfare-maximizing.

6. Discount Policies and Registration

This section analyzes discounts as a means to affect the consumers’ registration decision. Discounts (store credit) offered conditional on buying are a widely used instrument in online markets, not least because behavior-based targeting has been facilitated by the increased information collection in the Internet.35 We show that discounts can be used to make even those consumers who have high costs of registration register and can, thus, be part of a successful registration policy.

If the firm requires ex ante registration but offers price discounts to consumers who register, this affects the firm’s equilibrium posted price and the consumers’ beliefs about the price. In particular, if all consumers who register are offered a discount, then the firm will simply increase its posted price by the amount of the discount.36 Therefore, in the baseline model of Section 3 with homogeneous registration costs, discounts have no net effect on the profitability of ex ante registration requirements since all of the consumers who register (or none of them) will have obtained a discount.37 But discounts have an effect when consumers differ in their concerns about registration, which is a reasonable assumption and which we make in the remainder of this section.

The simplest case to make this point is the one where there are two types of consumers: a share $1 - q$ of consumers with registration costs of $k_{RH}$; and a share $q$ of consumers with registration costs of $k_{RL}$ where $k_G \leq k_{RL} < k_{RH}$. An interpretation of this setup is that a share $q$ of the consumers has only an opportunity cost $k_{RL}$ of registration and the remaining share $1 - q$ has higher costs $k_{RH}$ of registration due to privacy and security concerns.

Consider the modified game in which the firm offers a discount $d \geq 0$ (store credit) to a share $\delta \geq 0$ of consumers. The discount policy $(d, \delta)$ is chosen and announced in stage 1, together with the platform choice. In stage 2, the consumers observe the registration requirement and learn if they are offered a discount $d$. The discount $d$ is offered conditional on buying. Hence, for consumers who have obtained a discount, the price to be paid is reduced from $p$ to $p - d$. But as explained above the discount policy also affects the equilibrium price $p$ charged by the firm. If the firm requires ex ante registration and the share of consumers who register consists both of consumers with discount and consumers without discount, the optimal price $p_d$ is a function of $d$ (and of $\delta$) and fulfills

$$p_d - d < p(0) < p_d;$$

that is, the optimal price net of discount $p_d - d$ is smaller than the price $p(0)$ without discounts, but the posted price $p_d$ is increased.38 In other words, discounts
are added to the price but to less than 100%. This leads to a price distortion: instead of selling at the optimal price \( p(0) \) to registered consumers, the firm sells at effective prices \( p_d - d < p(0) \) and \( p_d > p(0) \) to consumers with discount and without discount, respectively.

The most interesting case emerges when \( k_{RL} < \bar{u}(0) < k_{RH} \) (where consumer surplus \( \bar{u}(0) \) is given in (5)). In this case, if the firm requires ex ante registration and no discounts are offered (\( \delta = 0 \)), then only consumers with low registration costs are willing to register. In the candidate equilibrium in which the firm offers discounts as incentive for high-cost consumers to register, consumers correctly anticipate the price \( p_d \) for a given policy \((d, \delta)\). Therefore, high-cost consumers with discount register if and only if

\[
\int_{p_d - d}^{\infty} (\theta - (p_d - d)) dF(\theta) \geq k_{RH},
\]

whereas low-cost consumers without a discount register if and only if

\[
\int_{p_d}^{\infty} (\theta - p_d) dF(\theta) \geq k_{RL}.
\]

The firm’s incentive to offer discounts depends on the degree to which it is able to target the discount to consumers who would not register without discount. In the worst case for the firm, discounts are allocated purely randomly to the consumers such that the probability that a consumer with registration cost \( k_{RH} \) receives a discount is equal to \( 1 - q' \) (that is, equal to the probability that \( k = k_{RH} \)), and the probability that a consumer with low registration cost \( k_{RL} \) receives a discount is equal to \( q' \). We first show that offering discounts can be profitable for the firm even when the firm offers the discounts on a purely random basis.

**Proposition 5.** Consider the case of random discounts and suppose that \( k_{RL} < \bar{u}(0) < k_{RH} \) where \( \bar{u}(0) \) is defined as in (5). If \( k_{RH} \) is sufficiently close to \( \bar{u}(0) \), the firm achieves strictly higher profits if it requires ex ante registration and offers a discount to a random share of consumers than (i) if it requires ex ante registration and offers no discounts and (ii) if it does not require ex ante registration.

Discounts distort the firm’s pricing decision. Moreover, if the firm cannot target the discounts to consumers with high registration costs, they are also paid to consumers who would register even without discount. Nevertheless, even randomly offered discounts can increase the firm’s expected profit. The intuition for Proposition 5 is as follows. When \( k_{RH} \) is close to \( \bar{u}(0) \), only a small discount is needed in order that high-cost consumers with discount register.\(^{39}\) The firm can give such a small discount to almost all consumers. Moreover, the price \( p_d \) is close to \( p(0) \); thus, all low-cost consumers will register, including those who have not received a discount, and the price distortion effect is small. Therefore, the profit of the firm is almost equal to \( \pi(0) \) (where \( \pi(0) \) is given in (2)). The proof of Proposition 5 shows that for any fixed \( \delta \in (0, 1) \), the firm’s profit converges to \( \pi(0) + \delta(1 - q')\pi(0) \) if \( k_{RH} \rightarrow \bar{u}(0) \) (since all low-cost types and a share \( \delta \) of the high-cost types register). Thus the firm can achieve a profit that is close to \( \pi(0) \) when \( k_{RH} \) is close to \( \bar{u}(0) \).

The case of purely random discounts is the most unfavorable case for the profitability of discounts. The better the firm is able to target the discounts to consumers with high registration costs, the less costly becomes the use of discounts, and the more attractive becomes the ex ante registration policy with discounts. We model targeting such that it reduces the probability that a low-cost type receives a discount to \( q' < q \) and increases the probability that a high-cost type receives a discount to \( 1 - q' > 1 - q \). Of course, the share of discounts received by high-cost types cannot be higher than the share of high-cost consumers in the population. Formally, in order that a discount policy \((d, \delta)\) is feasible with targeting technology \( q' \), it must satisfy \((1 - q')\delta \leq 1 - q \).

**Proposition 6.** The firm’s profit in case of ex ante registration requirements with discounts is strictly increasing in the ability to target the discounts to consumers with high registration costs.

In the extreme case in which discounts can be perfectly targeted to high-cost consumers, each additional discount offered attracts an additional consumer who registers, whereas in the case of purely random discounts the probability of an additional consumer who registers, whereas in the case of purely random discounts the probability of an additional consumer is only \( 1 - q \) (the probability that a high-cost consumer gets the discount). Moreover, keeping the number of discounts \( \delta \) fixed, improved targeting (a decrease in \( q' \)) leads to a smaller price distortion since there will be more consumers without discount among the registered consumers. Both effects increase the profitability of using discounts. If the cost of making use of targeting is increasing in the “targeting quality” \( q - q' \), there exists an optimal targeting technology that takes some interior value if the first unit of targeting is sufficiently cheap but perfect targeting is prohibitively costly.

In reality, targeting will be typically imperfect, even though firms do certainly better than just randomly offering discounts. To improve the targeting, firms can use similar instruments as in the context of targeted advertising and attach discounts to certain consumer characteristics they can observe and expect to be correlated with the registration costs. This includes socioeconomic information but also information about consumer attitudes and interests and about previous purchases at this or other firms obtained, e.g., through
cookies. For instance, the firm may attach the discount to the purchase of another product. Moreover, firms sometimes offer discounts to consumers who started but then canceled the registration process but already provided an e-mail address, for instance, or offer a price reduction to buyers in case they set up an account. Similarly, the use of a mobile device or a certain web browser typically allows to conclude on some consumer characteristics (such as age cohort or income group). Thus, improved information about the consumers can also be valuable in that it makes it cheaper to target certain groups of consumers and increase their willingness to register ex ante by offering discounts.

To conclude this section, we note that the incentive for using discounts to attract additional consumers is stronger if the firm also values the information that consumers provide when they register (as in Section 5). Moreover, the incentive to use discounts carries over to the dynamic model: offering discounts at the beginning of period $t$ can increase the firm’s profits and enlarge the range in which ex ante registration requirements are optimal. In the dynamic model, if ex ante registration requirements are not feasible, the firm has an incentive to offer discounts to consumers in case they register when buying in period $t$. As long as not all consumers are offered such a discount (valid in period $t + 1$), such discounts make consumers more willing to set up an account (compared to buying with a guest checkout).

7. Conclusion

Buying at online shops usually requires the disclosure of personal information such as address and payment details and can, therefore, cause a nonmonetary “registration cost” if the consumers have privacy and security concerns. We show that firms have an incentive to shift this registration cost to an earlier stage of the shopping process and to detach it from the actual buying decision, which has implications for the firms’ platform design.

In our baseline model, consumers are ex ante uncertain about the price and their product valuation. This information can, however, be released by the firm at zero cost; hence, we assume that search costs do not to play a role in this market. Firms decide when to release this information: before or after the consumer has signed in to the website. Our model can also be interpreted such that some information is already released ex ante (an option incorporated in the probability distribution of consumer valuations) and the firm decides when to release the residual information. We first show that a monopoly firm should require registration at an early stage, unless privacy and security concerns are very important for consumer behavior. Making the registration costs “sunk” at the point when consumers decide whether to buy makes the consumers more willing to buy, for instance, when credit card information is already entered and stored in the consumer’s user account. This leads to higher demand and higher profits for the firm.

Next, we incorporate important additional features of online markets into the baseline model and analyze their interaction with ex ante registration requirements. First, we consider a multiperiod model with the possibility of repeat purchases. If consumers consider purchasing repeatedly at a given firm, they expect a higher surplus from setting up an account at the firm. Therefore, the higher the likelihood that a consumer returns, the larger becomes the range in which the firm can profitably implement ex ante registration requirements. This holds even though registered consumers can observe price and product information without any additional registration costs in future periods. Put differently, the logic of ex ante registration requirements established in the baseline model based on “within-period” uncertainty about the product characteristics also applies vis-à-vis future transactions, which become more likely, and therefore more profitable for the firm, if consumers are already registered. The multiperiod setup also derives conditions under which the firm prefers to offer the option of guest checkout (letting consumers buy without a user account).

The higher demand with ex ante registration is particularly profitable for firms if they also care about the information that consumers provide when they register. In addition, firms may value user information from consumers who register but do not buy. Both aspects make ex ante registration requirements relatively more profitable and, hence, interact with the “sunk cost” advantage of ex ante registration, as we show in Section 5. Because of the value of consumer registration, firms may want to give consumers additional incentives to register if their privacy concerns distract them from setting up an account. Section 6 shows that discounts (store credit) offered conditional on buying can increase the share of consumers who are willing to register even though discount policies distort the firm’s pricing decision and even when the firm’s ability to target these discounts to the marginal consumers is low. Therefore, the optimal platform choice can involve both ex ante registration requirements and discounts offered to a share of consumers. Since discount policies become more profitable if the firm is able to target these discounts to consumers with strong privacy concerns who would not register without a discount, firms may want to invest in improved targeting by offering the discounts based on observable consumer characteristics which they expect to be correlated with their registration costs.
Finally, in the online appendix we show that the firms’ incentives to require ex ante registration carry over to the case of competition between firms by mitigating price competition. In particular, firms with loyal consumers (incumbent firms) may choose ex ante registration requirements as part of their business strategy; given that a sufficiently high share of consumers registers, they benefit from an increase in turnover as well as in the price they can charge. In contrast, ex ante registration requirements are less advisable for firms with no loyal consumers. They compete for the noncommitted consumers and achieve higher profits when reducing the amount of personal information to be revealed by consumers ex ante.

The degree to which firms may want to influence the consumers’ cost of registration depends on the trade-off between changes in demand and changes in the benefits from increased information revelation of the consumers, although it will hardly be possible to completely remove all consumers’ privacy and security concerns. In particular, the “registration cost” is at least partly independent of the firm a consumer considers buying from since privacy concerns are also caused by data collection and the use and abuse of personal information by third parties.

The profitability of the different registration policies can also interact with aspects of consumer decision making that go beyond what we have considered in the present paper. On the one hand, consumers may strongly dislike certain types of registration requirements and “boycott” such online shops, an aspect which may be reflected in high rates of shopping cart abandonment. On the other hand, the well-documented “sunk-cost fallacy” could make ex ante registration requirements even more profitable when the feeling of having already incurred some costs makes consumers more willing to buy once they have gone through the process of registration.

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Appendix
A.1. Proof of Remark 1
Under \( r = G \) and \( r = ExP \) the consumers can observe the price before they decide whether to buy, even in the case without price commitment. Thus the analysis above applies. In particular, with guest checkout the firm makes a profit \( \pi(k_\text{r}) > \pi(k_\text{G}) \) such that it strictly prefers \( r = G \) over \( r = ExP \).

The profit of the firm from \( r = ExA \) with price commitment is

\[
\pi_c(k_r) := \max_p (1 - F(p)) p \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \int_0^\infty (\theta - p) dF(p) \geq k_r
\]

whenever \( k_r \leq E(\theta) \). The constraint ensures that consumers are willing to register. When \( k_r \) increases toward \( E(\theta) \), the price, and thus the profit, must approach zero since otherwise consumers are not willing to register. For \( k_r > E(\theta) \), profit is zero since consumers are not willing to register ex ante at any positive price. On the other hand, if \( k_r \leq \bar{u}(0) \) then the constraint on consumer registration does not bind in the optimum so that \( \pi_c(k_r) = \pi(0) \). Moreover, \( \pi_c(k_r) \) is decreasing in \( k_r \) and continuous. Since \( \pi(0) > \pi(k_r) \) (by Proposition 1), there exists a threshold \( \hat{k}_r \in (\bar{u}(0), E(\theta)) \) such that the firm chooses \( r = ExA \) if \( k_r \leq \hat{k}_r \) and chooses \( r = G \) otherwise.

A.2. Proof of Remark 2
Under \( r = ExA \), the firm’s optimal price is independent of \( k_r \) and equal to \( p(0) \). Anticipating this price, all consumers with \( k_r \leq \bar{u}(0) \) register, which leads to a profit of \( H_k(\bar{u}(0))\pi(0) \) because \( H_k(\bar{u}(0)) \) is the share of consumers who register and \( \pi(0) \) is the firm’s expected profit per consumer. If \( r \neq ExA \), the firm prefers \( r = G \) over \( r = ExP \) because \( k_r \leq k_\text{G} \) (and \( k_r < k_\text{G} \) with strictly positive probability), just as in Proposition 1. Since for a given \( k_r \), a consumer buys with probability \( 1 - F(\bar{p} + k_r) \), the firm’s expected profit under \( r = G \) is

\[
\bar{\pi}_G = \max_p \int_0^\infty (1 - F(\bar{p} + k_r)) p dH_c(k_r).
\]

Thus, the firm prefers \( r = ExA \) over \( r = G \) if and only if \( H_k(\bar{u}(0)) \geq \bar{\pi}_G / \pi(0) \). Obviously, \( \bar{\pi}_G / \pi(0) > 0 \). It remains to show that \( \bar{\pi}_G / \pi(0) < 1 \). As in the proof of Proposition 1, with \( \bar{\beta} \) denoting the optimal price in case of \( r = G \), it holds that

\[
\bar{\pi}(0) = \int_0^\infty (1 - F(\bar{p} + k_r)) p dH_c(k_r)
\]

\[
\geq \int_0^\infty (1 - F(\bar{\beta} + k_r)) (\bar{\beta} + k_r) dH_c(k_r)
\]

\[
\geq \int_0^\infty (1 - F(\bar{\beta} + k_r)) \bar{\beta} dH_c(k_r) = \bar{\pi}_G.
\]

A.3. Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose first that \( k_r \leq \bar{u}(0) \). (Recall that \( p(k), \pi(k), \) and \( \bar{u}(k) \) are defined in (1), (2), and (3), respectively.) In period \( t + 1 \), the firm’s optimal policy is as in Proposition 1: it chooses \( r_{t+1} = ExA \) and charges a price \( p(0) \). Consumers who already have an account from period \( t \) can buy using this discount; all other consumers register because \( k_r \leq \bar{u}(0) \). Hence, a consumer’s expected period \( t + 1 \) utility is equal to \( \bar{u}(0) \) if he already has an account and equal to \( \bar{u}(0) - k_r \) in case he does not register in \( t \). Thus, all consumers register in period \( t \) and the firm’s total expected utility is equal to \( 2\bar{u}(0) - k_r \) in case he registers and equal to \( 0 + \bar{u}(0) - k_r \) in case he does not register in \( t \). Thus, all consumers register in period \( t \) and the firm’s total profit is equal to \( 2\pi(0) \), which is strictly higher than what the firm can get for any \( r \neq ExA \) (where the profit in period \( t \) is strictly less than \( \pi(0) \), and the profit in \( t + 1 \) is at most \( \pi(0) \)).

Now suppose that \( \bar{u}(0) < k_r \leq 2\bar{u}(0) - \bar{u}(k_r) \). In period \( t + 1 \), since \( \bar{u}(0) < k_r \), consumers who do not yet have an account
would not register. Therefore, the firm chooses \( r_{t+1} = G \) (it does not gain anything from forcing the consumers to register ex post in the last period; compare the proof of Proposition 1) and charges a price \( p(0) \) to consumers who buy with an existing account and a price \( p(k_c) \) to consumers who buy as a guest. All consumers can observe their valuation at no cost. Registered consumers buy using their accounts at price \( p(0) \) because under Assumption 1, \( p(0) < p(k_c) + k_c \) (where the latter is a consumer’s total cost of buying with a guest account). Consumers who are not yet registered in period \( t + 1 \) buy using guest checkout (since \( p(k_c) + k_c < p(0) + k_g \)). Therefore, registered consumers expect a period \( t + 1 \) utility of \( \bar{u}(0) \), whereas nonregistered consumers expect a period \( t + 1 \) utility of \( \bar{u}(k_c) < \bar{u}(0) \). In period \( t \), if the firm sets \( r_t = ExA \), the total expected utility of consumers who register in \( t \) is equal to \( 2\bar{u}(0) - k_R \), and the total expected utility of consumers who do not register in \( t \) is equal to \( 0 + \bar{u}(k_c) \). Hence, if (8) holds, all consumers register in \( t \) and the firm realizes its maximum profit of \( 2\bar{u}(0) \).

If (8) is violated, no consumer registers in \( t \) and the firm’s total profits under \( r_t = ExA \) are \( 0 + \pi(k_c) \) (since all consumers use the guest checkout offered in period \( t + 1 \)); the firm can get, however, a total profit of (at least) \( 2\bar{u}(0) \) if \( r_t = G \). Therefore, the firm will require ex ante registration in \( t \) if and only if (8) holds.

### A.4. Proof of Lemma 1

Consider first period \( t + 1 \). Since \( r_t = ExA \) is not feasible, there will be a strictly positive mass of consumers who are not yet registered in period \( t + 1 \) (those consumers with low \( \theta \)). The firm sets \( r_{t+1} = G \) (which, because \( \pi(k_c) > \pi(k_g) \), yields higher profits than \( r_{t+1} = ExP \)); charges a price \( p(k_c) \) to consumers without an account; and charges a price \( p(0) \) to consumers who buy with an existing account. Consumers with an account (from period \( t \)) prefer to sign in with their account and buy at \( p(0) < p(k_c) + k_c \); consumers without an account buy using guest checkout.

Now consider period \( t \). A consumer with valuation \( \theta_t \) who sets up an account and buys in period \( t \) gets a total expected utility of

\[
\theta_t - p_t - k_c + \bar{u}(0) \tag{14}
\]

since he expects a surplus of \( \bar{u}(0) \) in period \( t + 1 \) where he is already registered. A consumer with valuation \( \theta_t \) who buys in \( t \) using guest checkout gets a total expected utility of

\[
\theta_t - p_t - k_c + \bar{u}(k_c) \tag{15}
\]

since he expects a surplus of \( \bar{u}(k_c) \) in period \( t + 1 \) where he does not have an account. Comparing (14) and (15) shows that a consumer prefers using guest checkout over buying with an account if and only if

\[
k_c - k_g > \bar{u}(0) - \bar{u}(k_c). \tag{16}
\]

If \( k_c \to 0 \), the right-hand side of (16) approaches zero and (16) holds. Moreover, the right-hand side of (16) strictly increases in \( k_c \) and the left-hand side of (16) strictly decreases in \( k_c \). If \( k_c \to k_g \), then (16) is violated. Thus, there exists a unique \( \hat{k}_c \in (0, k_g) \) such that (16) holds if and only if \( k_c < \hat{k}_c \).

(i) In period \( t + 1 \), the firm makes a profit of \( \pi(0) \) per registered consumer and a profit of \( \pi(k_c) < \pi(0) \) per nonregistered consumer; hence, its total period \( t + 1 \) profit is strictly increasing in the share of consumers who are already registered. Under \( r_t = G \), no consumer registers in \( t \) in case of \( k_c < \hat{k}_c \). In contrast, if \( r_t = ExP \), consumers with a sufficiently high \( \theta_t \) register/buy in \( t \). To be precise, those consumers for whom the total expected surplus in (14) is larger than the expected total surplus from not buying in \( t \) (which is \( 0 + \bar{u}(k_c) \)); that is, under \( r_t = ExP \), the share of consumers who register in \( t \) is equal to

\[
1 - F(p_t + k_g - (\bar{u}(0) - \bar{u}(k_c))) > 0.
\]

Together with \( \pi(k_c) < \pi(0) \) this shows that \( \pi_{t+1}(r_t = ExP) > \pi_{t+1}(r_t = G) \) if \( k_c < \hat{k}_c \).

(ii) Suppose first that \( r_t = ExP \). The firm’s total expected profits \( \pi_t + \pi_{t+1} \) when choosing a price \( p_t \) are

\[
\begin{align*}
&[1 - F(p_t + k_g - (\bar{u}(0) - \bar{u}(k_c)))](p_t + \pi(0)) \\
&+ F(p_t + k_g - (\bar{u}(0) - \bar{u}(k_c)))(\pi(k_c)) \tag{17}
\end{align*}
\]

since the firm expects total profits of \( p_t + \pi(0) \) from consumers who register/buy in period \( t \) and expects total profits of \( 0 + \pi(k_c) \) from the remaining consumers who do not register/buy in \( t \). The optimal choice of \( p_t \) is the solution to the first order condition

\[
p_t = \frac{1 - F(p_t + k_g - (\bar{u}(0) - \bar{u}(k_c))]}{F(p_t + k_g - (\bar{u}(0) - \bar{u}(k_c))]} - (\pi(0) - \pi(k_c)). \tag{18}
\]

Ignoring the term \( \pi(0) - \pi(k_c) \), the optimal choice \( p_t \) would be the price that takes into account a consumer’s adjusted registration costs \( k_g - (\bar{u}(0) - \bar{u}(k_c)) \) (adjusted by the expected future surplus from registration). The term \( \pi(0) - \pi(k_c) \) in (18), however, causes the firm’s optimal price in \( t \) to be lower: A lower price in period \( t \) increases the probability that consumers register, in which case the firm’s future profits increase; \( \pi(0) - \pi(k_c) \) represents the relative increase in future profits if the share of registered consumers goes up. Denoting the solution to (18) by \( p_{t, ExP}^* \), the period \( t \) profit of the firm is

\[
\pi_t(r_t = ExP) = [1 - F(p_{t, ExP}^* + k_g - (\bar{u}(0) - \bar{u}(k_c)))]p_{t, ExP}^*.
\]

Suppose that \( r_t = G \). Since \( k_c < \hat{k}_c \), consumers buy in period \( t \) using guest checkout. Therefore, the price \( p_t \) has no implications for the period \( t + 1 \) profit, and will be chosen by the firm to maximize the period \( t \) profit, which is

\[
\pi_t(r_t = G) = \max_p \{1 - F(p + k_g)\} p \]

\[
\geq [1 - F(p_{t, ExP}^* + k_g - (\bar{u}(0) - \bar{u}(k_c)))]
\cdot (p_{t, ExP}^* + k_g - (\bar{u}(0) - \bar{u}(k_c)) - k_c)
\]

\[
> [1 - F(p_{t, ExP}^* + k_g - (\bar{u}(0) - \bar{u}(k_c)))]p_{t, ExP}^* = \pi_t(r_t = ExP).
\]

The strict inequality follows from \( k_c < \hat{k}_c \) (i.e., (16) holds).
A.5. Proof of Proposition 3
If \(k_C \geq k_G\), consumers prefer ex post registration over using guest checkout and the firm’s total profits are the same under \(r_i = G\) and under \(r_i = \text{Exp}\). By our tie-breaking rule, the firm chooses \(r_i = \text{Exp}\) in this case. Thus, suppose in the following that \(k_C < k_G\), and consider the firm’s profits under the two platform choices \(r_i = \text{Exp}\) and \(r_i = G\). The firm’s total profits in case of \(r_i = \text{Exp}\) are

\[
\sum_{t=1}^{\pi} \pi_t(r_i = \text{Exp}) = \max\left\{\left[1 - F(p + k_R - (\bar{u}(0) - \bar{u}(k_C)))(p + \pi(0))\right] + F(p + k_R - (\bar{u}(0) - \bar{u}(k_C))\pi(k_C)\right\}.
\]

The firm’s total profits in case of \(r_i = G\) are \(\sum_{t=1}^{\pi} \pi_t(r_i = G) = 2\pi(k_C)\). Let

\[
\Delta := \sum_{t=1}^{\pi} \pi_t(r_i = \text{Exp}) - \sum_{t=1}^{\pi} \pi_t(r_i = G).
\]

If \(k_C \to 0\), total profits under \(r_i = G\) approach \(2\pi(0)\), whereas total profits under \(r_i = \text{Exp}\) are strictly smaller than \(2\pi(0)\); thus \(\Delta < 0\) if \(k_C \to 0\). Now suppose that \(k_C \to k_G\), which is equivalent to \(k_R - (\bar{u}(0) - \bar{u}(k_C)) \to k_G\). With (19), total profits under \(r_i = \text{Exp}\) approach

\[
\max\left\{\left[1 - F(p + k_C)(p + \pi(0)) + F(p + k_C)\pi(k_C)\right] + \left[1 - F(p(k_C + k_C))(p(k_C) + \pi(0)) + F(p(k_C) + k_C)\pi(k_C)\right]\right\} > 1 - F(p(k_C, v_C) + k_C)(p(k_C, v_C) + k_C + v_B + v_R)
\]

where the latter is equal to total profits under \(r_i = G\) (the second inequality follows from \(\pi(0) > \pi(k_C)\)). Therefore, \(\Delta > 0\) if \(k_C \to k_G\).

Finally, differentiate (19), denote the profit maximizing price in period \(t\) under \(r_i = \text{Exp}\) by \(p_t^{*}, \text{Exp}\), and use the envelope theorem, to obtain

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial k_C} \sum_{t=1}^{\pi} \pi_t(r_i = \text{Exp}) = -F'(p_t^{*}, \text{Exp} + k_R - (\bar{u}(0) - \bar{u}(k_C)))(p_t^{*}, \text{Exp} + \pi(0)) \frac{\partial \bar{u}(k_C)}{\partial k_C}
\]

Thus, with \(\partial (\sum_{t=1}^{\pi} \pi_t(r_i = G)) / \partial k_C = 2\pi(k_C) / \partial k_C\), we get

\[
\frac{\partial \Delta}{\partial k_C} = -F'(p_t^{*}, \text{Exp} + k_R - (\bar{u}(0) - \bar{u}(k_C)))(p_t^{*}, \text{Exp} + \pi(0)) \frac{\partial \bar{u}(k_C)}{\partial k_C}
\]

which is strictly positive since \(\pi(0) > \pi(k_C)\), \(\bar{u}(k_C) / \partial k_C < 0\), and \(\partial \pi(k_C) / \partial k_C < 0\). It follows that there exists \(k_C \in (0, k_G)\) such that the firm strictly prefers \(r_i = G\) over \(r_i = \text{Exp}\) if and only if \(k_C < k_G\).

A.6. Proof of Proposition 4
Denote the solution to (10) by \(\hat{v}(k, v)\). Allowing for negative prices, the optimal price \(p(k, v)\) is given by (10) if \(\bar{u}(k, v) \geq k\) and is equal to \(-k\) otherwise.

(i) Suppose that the firm chooses \(r = \text{Exp}\) and that inequality (11) holds. Anticipating the price \(p(0, v_B)\), all consumers register, and the firm’s profit is equal to

\[
(1 - F(p(0, v_B)))(p(0, v_B) + v_B) + v_R,
\]

which must be (weakly) larger than the profit when choosing a price \(p = p(k_B, v_B) + k_B\), that is, larger than

\[
(1 - F(p(k_B, v_B) + k_B))(p(k_B, v_B) + k_B + v_B) + v_R
\]

where the latter is the firm’s profit when choosing \(r = G\).

(ii) Suppose that inequality (11) is violated; then the firm’s profit under \(r = \text{Exp}\) is zero since no consumer registers. The profit under \(r = \text{Exp}\) is equal to

\[
(1 - F(p(k_B, v_B) + k_B))(p(k_B, v_B) + k_B + v_B) + v_R.
\]

Note that (21) is strictly increasing in the value of consumer information \(v_B\) and \(v_B\). Under \(r = G\), the firm gets a profit equal to

\[
(1 - F(p(k_C, v_C) + k_C))(p(k_C, v_C) + v_C).
\]

Suppose that \(v_B + v_R = v_B + k_B - k_G\). The firm’s profit under \(r = \text{Exp}\) is then

\[
\max_{\bar{u}} (1 - F(p + k_C))(p + v_C + k_B - k_G) = \max_{\bar{u}} (1 - F(x + k_C)(x + v_C)),
\]

where the equality follows from replacing \(x = p + k_B - k_G\). The right-hand side of (23) is equal to the profit under \(r = G\). Thus the profit under \(r = \text{Exp}\) equals the profit under \(r = G\) when \(v_B + v_R = v_C + k_B - k_C\). Since (21) is strictly increasing in \(v_B + v_R\), the firm chooses \(r = \text{Exp}\) if and only if \(v_B + v_R \geq v_C + k_B - k_C\) and chooses \(r = G\) otherwise.

A.7. Proof of Remark 3
We first compare the profits under ex ante and ex post registration requirements. Denote by \(\Delta(v_R, v_B)\) the difference in profits under \(r = \text{Exp}\) (as given in (20)) and under \(r = \text{Exp}\) (as given in (21)); that is,

\[
\Delta(v_R, v_B) = (1 - F(p(0, v_B)))(p(0, v_B) + v_B) + v_R
\]

\[
- (1 - F(p(k_R + v_B + k_B))(p(k_R, v_B) + v_B + v_R).
\]
Step 1. Suppose that \( v_R = 0 \). Using the envelope theorem, we get
\[
\frac{\partial \Delta(0, v_B)}{\partial v_B} = (1 - F(p(0, v_B))) - (1 - F(p(k_R, v_B + k_R) + k_R)) \geq 0,
\]
with strict inequality whenever \( v_B \) is sufficiently small such that \( p(k_R, v_B + k_R) + k_R > p(0, v_B) \). (The latter is true by Assumption 1 as long as \( p(k_R, v_B + k_R) > -k_R \). Note also that \( p(k_R, v_B + k_R) = -k_R \) implies that \( p(0, v_B) = 0 \), in which case we get \( \frac{\partial \Delta(0, v_B)}{\partial v_B} = 0 \). Hence, if only nonnegative prices are possible then Assumption 1 implies that \( \frac{\partial \Delta(0, v_B)}{\partial v_B} > 0 \).

Step 2. For any \( v_B \geq 0 \), using again the envelope theorem,
\[
\frac{\partial \Delta(v_R, v_B)}{\partial v_B} \geq 1 - (1 - F(p(k_R, v_B + v_R) + k_R)) \geq 0,
\]
with strict inequality whenever \( v_B \) and \( v_R \) are sufficiently small.

Step 3. If \( v_B = 0 \), it follows by Step 2 that \( \Delta(v_R, v_B) > \Delta(0, 0) \)
if \( v_B > 0 \). If \( v_B = 0 \), then by Steps 1 and 2, \( \Delta(0, 0) < \Delta(v_R, v_B) \).

Next, denote the difference in profits under \( r = ExA \) and under \( r = G \) (as given in (22)) by \( \Delta(v_R, v_b, v_c) \). Note first that because \( v_c \leq v_R + v_B \), we get \( \Delta(v_R, v_B, v_c) \geq \Delta(v_R, v_B, v_R + v_B) \); that is, the difference in profits is weakly larger than if the value of user information under \( r = G \) is as in case of \( r = ExP \) above. Since the result above for the comparison of \( r = ExA \) and \( r = ExP \) holds for any \( k_R > 0 \), it follows analogous to Steps 1-3 above that \( \Delta(0, 0, 0) \leq \Delta(v_R, v_B, v_C) \) for any \( (v_R, v_B, v_C) \neq (0, 0, 0) \).

### A.8. Proof of Proposition 5

Let \( r = ExA \) and suppose that all consumers with registration cost \( k_{RL} \) register independently of whether they are offered a discount, but consumers with registration cost \( k_{RH} \) register if and only they are offered a discount. For a discount policy \((d, \delta)\), the firm’s expected profit is
\[
\pi_d(p; r = ExA) := \delta(1 - F(p - d))(p - d) + (1 - \delta)q(1 - F(p))p. \tag{24}
\]
This profit function takes into account (i) a share \( \delta \) of consumers registers with discount and may buy at an effective price \( p - d \) and (ii) that a share \( (1 - \delta)q \) of consumers register without having a discount (all being low-cost types) and may buy at price \( p \). The price \( p_d \) that maximizes (24) is given by the first order condition
\[
\delta[-F(p_d - d)(p_d - d) + 1 - F(p_d - d)] + (1 - \delta)q[-F(p_d)p_d + 1 - F(p_d)] = 0. \tag{25}
\]
Under Assumption 1 on \( F \), \( p_d \) is increasing in \( d \) and \( p_d - d \) is decreasing in \( d \), which can be verified by implicit differentiation of (25). Hence, \( p_d \) is larger than the price \( p(0)(d = 0) \) as given in (1)) but \( p_d - d \) is smaller than \( p(0) \). Higher discounts \( d \) lead to a stronger price distortion, which reduces the firm’s profits (taking as given the share of consumers who register). Therefore, if the firm decides to offer a discount, it will choose \( d \) such that only high-cost types are willing to register. (The left-hand side of the inequality in (12) is increasing in \( d \). The firm will choose \( d \) such that (12) holds with equality; due to the price distortion effect, the firm will not increase the discount any further.) Since \( p_d \) depends on the share \( \delta \) of consumers with discount, \( d \) can be expressed as a continuous function of \( \delta \). Note that the discount \( d(\delta) \) necessary to induce high-cost types to register is increasing in \( \delta \) since the price \( p_d \) also increases in \( \delta \). The more consumers get a discount, the stronger is the price increase, and the higher must be the discount to make a high-cost consumer willing to register.

Fix any \( \delta \in (0, 1) \) and let \( k_{RH} \rightarrow \bar{u}(0) \), holding \( \delta \) constant. Suppose the firm chooses the discount \( d \) such that (12) holds with equality. If \( k_{RH} \) is close to \( \bar{u}(0) \), such a discount clearly exists.) By (12), \( p(d - d) \rightarrow p(0) \). By definition of \( p(0) \), it follows that
\[
[-F(p_d - d)(p_d - d) + 1 - F(p_d - d)]\rightarrow 0.
\]
By (25) this implies that
\[
[-F(p_d)p + 1 - F(p_d)]\rightarrow 0,
\]
which means \( p_d \rightarrow p(0) \). Since \( (p_d - d) \rightarrow p(0) \), we conclude that \( d \rightarrow 0 \).

Since \( p_d \rightarrow p(0) \) if \( k_{RH} \rightarrow \bar{u}(0) \), the right-hand side of condition (13) approaches \( \bar{u}(0) \), which is by assumption strictly greater than \( k_{RL} \). Therefore, (13) holds for \( k_{RH} \) sufficiently close to \( \bar{u}(0) \). Moreover, with \( k_{RH} \rightarrow \bar{u}(0) \), the profit (24) approaches
\[
\delta\pi(0) + (1 - \delta)q\pi(0) = q\pi(0) + \delta(1 - q)\pi(0),
\]
where \( \pi(0) \) is as defined in (2). For any \( \delta > 0 \), this profit is strictly greater than \( q\pi(0) \), which is the profit the firm achieves when it requires ex ante registration and does not offer any discounts (since in this case only consumers with registration cost \( k_{RL} \) register). This proves part (i).

For part (ii), if the firm does not require ex ante registration, it chooses \( r = G \) and realizes a profit \( \pi(k_C) \) (as given in (2); compare Proposition 1). Here, the firm would not want to offer a discount since discounts distort the pricing decision. Since \( \pi(0) \) and \( \pi(k_C) \) do not depend on \( k_{RH} \), there exists \( \delta < 1 \) such that
\[
q\pi(0) + \delta(1 - q)\pi(0) > \pi(k_C),
\]
for all \( \delta > \bar{\delta} \) and all \( k_{RH} \geq \bar{u}(0) \). Suppose the firm chooses \( \delta \in (\bar{\delta}, 1) \). For \( k_{RH} \) sufficiently close to \( \bar{u}(0) \), the profit from the discount scheme is then sufficiently close to \( q\pi(0) + \delta(1 - q)\pi(0) \) and hence strictly larger than \( \pi(k_C) \).

### A.9. Proof of Proposition 6

Under targeting technology \( q' \leq q \), if the firm requires ex ante registration and chooses a discount policy \((d', \delta')\), the optimal price is the solution to
\[
\max_p \delta'(1 - F(p - d'))(p - d') + (q - q'\delta')(1 - F(p))p
\]
since (i) a share \( \delta' \) of consumers registers with discount and may buy at an effective price \( p - d' \) and (ii) a share \( q - q'\delta' \) of consumers registers without having a discount (all being low-cost types) and may buy at price \( p \). (Since the share of low types with discount is \( q'\delta' \), the share of low types without discount in the population must be \( q - q'\delta' \).) Anticipating this optimal price, which we denote by \( p'(q', \delta') \), the size of the discount will be such that a high-cost consumer is just
willing to register; that is, for given \((q', \delta')\), the optimal discount \(d(q', \delta')\) fulfills
\[
\int_{p' - d(q', \delta')}^{\infty} (\theta - (p' - d(q', \delta'))) \cdot dF(\theta) = k_{\text{RL}}.
\]

Consider two possible targeting technologies \(q'\) and \(q''\) with \(q'' < q'\). For targeting technology \(q'\), let \(\delta'\) be part of the profit-maximizing discount policy. The total share of consumers who register is equal to \(\delta' + q - q' \delta'\) (where \(q - q' \delta'\) is the share of low-cost consumers without discount). For targeting technology \(q''\), suppose that the firm chooses \(\delta'' = \delta'(1 - q''\delta'\))/\((1 - q'\delta')\). The total share of consumers who register under \(q''\) is equal to
\[
\delta'' + q - q'' \delta'' = \delta'(1 - q') + q
\]
and is, hence, the same as under targeting \(q'\). However, because \(1 - q'' > 1 - q'\), we get \(\delta'' < \delta'\); that is, the share of consumers with discount is strictly lower under \((q'', \delta'')\) than under \((q', \delta')\). Consequently, more consumers must register/buy without discount under \(q''\). This leads to a weaker price distortion under \(q''\) than under \(q'\); that is, \(p(q'', \delta'') < p(q', \delta')\). Thus, the discount necessary to make consumers with high registration costs willing to register is lower under \(q''\) (with \(\delta'' < \delta'\)) than under \(q'\) (with \(\delta'\)). These effects (weaker price distortion, lower discount, higher share of consumers who register without discount) cause the firm’s profit to be strictly higher under \(q''\) when choosing \(\delta'' = \delta'(1 - q''\delta')/(1 - q'\delta')\) than under \(q'\) (with the optimal \(\delta'\)). If under technology \(q''\) the optimal \(\delta \neq \delta''\), profits must be even higher.

Endnotes
1 Privacy concerns include concerns about the collection and use of personal information not only by firms and advertisers but also by governments. They are often closely related to security concerns such as the fear of the misuse of information (personal information as well as password and credit card information, for instance) and concerns about the security of communication channels. In their survey on identity theft, Anderson et al. (2008, p. 181) state: “Concern about maintaining the security of personal data may lead consumers to avoid online transactions, make them less willing to shop around for credit, or otherwise cause them to spend resources to protect their personal records.” For a review on the collection and use of personal information by companies and data brokers, see also Marwick (2014).

2 In older versions of iTunes, setting up a user account also required the provision of credit card or other valid payment information.

3 According to Suich (2014, p. 7), “Ads that encourage people to download apps account for a large proportion of mobile-ad spending.”

4 For instance, the “search inside books” at amazon.com is only available to registered customers.

5 In addition, online shops often keep uncertainty about the “registration cost” by not making transparent ex ante which information is required when setting up an account. High registration costs and privacy and security concerns are also considered reasons for why consumers may not complete an online transaction but abandon their shopping cart before the final purchase stage (see, e.g., Cho et al. 2006).

6 On repeat purchases and customer loyalty as determinants of the success of online sellers, see Reichheld and Schefter (2000) for seminal insights and Toufaily et al. (2013) for a review of the literature.

7 Brokering consumer information is an important source of revenue for online sellers (see, e.g., Lambrecht et al. 2014). Moreover, one reason for consumers’ privacy concerns is the sellers’ economic incentive to use the information revealed by the customer, either by selling it to third parties or by targeting ads or personalizing offers.

8 Discounts, promotional codes, and (digital) coupons are widely used instruments, in particular in e-commerce where they can be specifically targeted to certain groups of consumers, and are a way to induce consumers to reveal personal information (compare Shapiro and Varian 1999 and Office of Fair Trading 2010).

9 As argued by Smith and Brynjolfsson (2001) for online shopping, “brand is an important determinant of consumer choice” (p. 541), possibly out of concerns for noncontractible service quality such as shipping reliability or cognitive lock in. In the context of music streaming services, brand loyalty to the recently launched Apple Music, for instance, need not be a pure preference of consumers for a certain brand but can also emerge because of complementarities with other products (iPhones) that consumers already own.

10 Around 90% of the respondents have taken steps at least once to keep anonymity online and to avoid being tracked (for further details, see Raine et al. 2013, Madden 2014). According to the surveys conducted by Milne et al. (2014), around two-thirds of respondents had decided not to purchase at a website because of uncertainty about the use of personal information.

11 See also the survey by Anderson et al. (2008) on costs and implications of identity theft.

12 When consumers are aware of the quality (their valuation) of a product but have to incur a cost to learn its price, a hold-up problem emerges that may even result in a complete market breakdown (Stiglitz 1989, Section 2). The literature on informative advertising (surveyed by Bagwell 2007 and Renault 2016) has studied several ways to deal with this hold-up problem. In our setting, there is no market breakdown unless registration costs are prohibitively high since consumers are unaware of some product characteristics of the good prior to registration and need to “inspect” the product in order to learn their valuation.

13 For instance, registration costs also apply in situations in which consumers know all product and price details, whereas search costs are irrelevant in this case. Moreover, in the multi-period model, consumers can buy repeatedly with the same account and, hence, only need to incur the registration costs once, but incurring transportation or search costs once does not typically lower the transportation or search costs for future purchases.

14 We do not consider upfront payments made upon registration and independent of eventual purchase, such as up-front subsidies or registration fees. These may be misused and are rarely found in practice at online shops. A feasible and profitable form of subsidies are discounts or store credits that can be cashed in upon purchase, which we discuss in Section 6.

15 To simplify the notation, we assume here that there is a unique solution to the firm’s maximization problem given by the first-order condition, which can be guaranteed under additional assumptions on \(F\). For example, Assumption 1 introduced below is sufficient for the profit-maximizing price to be unique and given by (1).

16 There is an additional set of equilibria in which the firm sets a (high) price at which (4) is violated and all buyers believe that the firm sets this high price and hence do not register. In the following, we ignore these equilibria, which can be eliminated by an appropriate equilibrium refinement.

17 Since buyers do not know their valuation when registering and are symmetric ex ante, the distribution of types that the firm faces in stage 3 is still described by the distribution \(F\), leading to a price choice that is independent of \(\mu\) (as long as \(\mu > 0\)).
Assumption 1 guarantees that the pass-through rate of the registration costs takes an interior value between 0% and 100%; compare also Bulo and Pfleiderer (1983) and Weyl and Fabinger (2013). Related questions on pass-through rates arise in the literature on tax incidence (for a survey, see Fullerton and Metcalf 2002).

Since marginal production costs are assumed to be zero, all consumers with \( \theta > k_c \) should buy in the welfare optimum, but in case of \( r = G \), for instance, consumers buy only if \( \theta > p(k_c) + k_c \).

This can most easily be shown by using discrete distribution functions \( F \); however, smooth examples can also be constructed. Details are available upon request.

For instance, consumers can find a list of movies available on Netflix and other competing sellers on www.justwatch.com (accessed on June 11, 2016). It is doubtful, however, how much scrolling through such a list will improve the accuracy of a consumer’s estimate of his valuation of a subscription because viewing the complete list is likely to be prohibitively time consuming; moreover, the catalog will typically change within the period of subscription. Nevertheless, in the presence of such information the firms would need to keep the costs of registration sufficiently low in order not to deter consumers from registering and may want to provide services such as personalized recommendation systems that are difficult for consumers to judge ex ante and without inspecting the product.

For early papers on price competition with brand loyalty see Rosenthal (1980) and Narasimhan (1988). A similar structure emerges when a share of consumers is uninformed about the existence of other firms (Varian 1980, Baye and et al. 1992). Brand loyalty can be explained by switching cost, more specifically, for instance, by costly learning how to use new products, complementarities to other purchased products and network effects; for an overview of reasons for brand loyalty, see Klepper (1995). In Baye and Morgan (2001) loyalty emerges from local segregation of markets and can be broken down by creating a virtual marketplace on the Internet. See also Baye and Morgan (2009) for a model of price competition when consumer loyalty is endogenous and affected by advertising.

Note that this section does not rely on a “switching cost” argument since we consider a monopoly firm. Effects of registration requirements in competitive environments are analyzed in the online appendix.

To save on notation, we assume the valuations in the two periods to be identically distributed, but the results easily extend to the case where \( \theta_t \) and \( \theta_{t+1} \) are drawn independently from distribution functions \( F_t \) and \( F_{t+1} \), respectively. For the same reason we also abstract from discounting of future profits/surplus. The assumption of independence of \( \theta_t \) and \( \theta_{t+1} \) rules out some forms of price discrimination; we discuss this issue further below.

As in the baseline model, \( k_r \) and \( k_c \) are assumed to be identical across consumers, and \( 0 < k_c < k_r \).

Since \( \theta_t \) and \( \theta_{t+1} \) are independent, the firm cannot gain from discriminating between registered costumers based on their purchase behavior in \( t \). This allows us to focus on the choice of registration policies and to abstract from many additional aspects discussed in the literature on behavior-based price discrimination; see, for instance, Hart and Tirole (1988) and Villas-Boas (2004) for the case of a monopoly seller, Villas-Boas (1999) and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) for oligopolistic competition, and the surveys by Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2006) and Stole (2007). Aspects of e-commerce and improved information technologies in this context are discussed, for instance, by Taylor (2004) and Acquisti and Varian (2005) and in the survey by Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2012). In our model, the use of behavior-based price discrimination would also be complicated by the possibility for consumers to set up new accounts or use guest checkout.

If the firm charges the same price to all consumers, the price in period \( t+1 \) turns out to be an increasing function of the share of consumers who already have an account. But a higher price in \( t+1 \) reduces the consumers’ incentive to register in period \( t \) since they expect a lower future benefit from already having an account. Therefore, the price in \( t \) affects the price in \( t+1 \) and the share of consumers who register, and vice versa, and an individual consumer’s period \( t \) choice depends on all other consumers’ choices in \( t \). This generates considerable technical complexities in the analysis without affecting the main economic insights.

In this case consumer surplus and total welfare would be lower if user registration is not possible or allowed.

The critical value \( \hat{k}_c \) below which the firm offers the option of guest checkout is increasing in \( k_c \) since the firm’s profit under \( r = ExP \) is decreasing in \( k_c \), while its profit under \( r = G \) does not depend on \( k_c \).

A firm may also obtain information from consumers (for example, with cookies) who visit their websites but neither register nor buy. For ease of notation, we normalize the firm’s benefit from this information to zero. Thus the parameters \( v_x \), \( v_y \), and \( v_z \) should be interpreted as the value of the additional information obtained from registration and purchase with account or as a guest.

In what follows, we take the registration cost \( k_c \) and the distribution \( F \) of consumer valuations as given and analyze the impact of changes in \( v_x \), \( v_y \), and \( v_z \). In general, there might also be a (positive or negative) correlation between \( v_x \) and/or \( v_z \) on the one hand and \( k_c \) and/or \( \theta \) on the other hand. For instance, privacy concerns may be strengthened when consumers anticipate that the firm sells their personal information at high prices to third parties, which would lead to a higher \( k_c \). If \( v_x \) represents the firm’s benefit from targeted advertising, \( \theta \) may be increasing and/or \( k_c \) may be decreasing in \( v_x \). In addition, consumers may also be not fully aware of the consequences of the use of their information; in this context, see also Norberg et al. (2007) on divergences of consumers’ opinions and behavior and the survey by Acquisti et al. (2015) on privacy concerns and consumer behavior.

To be precise, allowing for negative prices and denoting the price solving (10) by \( p(k, \theta) \), the optimal price is given by \( max(p(k, \theta), -k) \). In case of \( r = ExA \), for instance, the firm sets a price equal to \( max(p(0, v_x), 0) \), whereas in case of \( r = ExP \) the optimal price is \( max(p(k_x, v_x + v_y) - k_c) \) (at a price \( p = -k_c \) all consumers register/buy; hence, the optimal price will never be lower).

The additional incentive to require ex ante registration due to the value of consumer information carries over to the dynamic model of Section 4; moreover, when ex ante registration requirements are not feasible, the firm’s incentive to require ex post registration in period \( t \) of the two-period model is strengthened if the firm also values the information consumers provide when registering. More precisely, the larger \( v_x \) and \( v_y \) (relative to \( v_z \)), the smaller becomes the range in Proposition 3 in which the firm offers the option of guest checkout; for sufficiently high \( v_x \) and \( v_y \), this interval becomes empty and the firm always requires consumers to set up an account in period \( t \).

It is straightforward to show this by example, assuming that \( \theta \) is distributed uniformly. To understand this indeterminacy, consider the difference in welfare under \( r = ExA \) and under \( r = ExP \). This difference is equal to \( \int \theta p(\theta) d\theta = F(\theta) - \int (F(k_x, v_x + v_y) + k_c) p(\theta) d\theta \). The first term captures the difference in the surplus from trade caused by the difference in equilibrium prices under \( ExA \) and \( ExP \). As argued above, \( p(k_x, v_x + v_y) < p(k_x, v_x) \) is strictly decreasing in \( v_x \); thus, this first term is positive (\( p(0, v_x) < p(k_x, v_x + v_y) + k_c \)) if and only if \( v_x - k_c < 0 \). The second term reflects the difference in direct registration costs and informational benefits caused by a share of consumers registering under \( r = ExP \). This second term is positive if and only if \( v_x - k_c > 0 \). Hence, there are two countervailing effects on welfare. If \( v_x \) is small compared to \( k_c \), there is more trade under \( ExA \) than under \( ExP \), but too many consumers register under \( ExA \) from a welfare perspective; this is the trade-off already identified in the benchmark model. If \( v_x \) is large compared
to $k^*$, there is more trade under ExP than under ExA, but from a welfare perspective all consumers should register, which is only achieved under ExA (unless $v_1$ is very large and $p(k^*, v_0 + v_1) + k^*$ becomes zero). In the knife edge case where $v_1 = k^*$, both effects are zero and welfare is the same under $r = ExA$ and $r = ExP$. Here, small perturbations can make ExA or ExP welfare superior. When comparing $r = ExA$ to $r = G$, the latter can be welfare superior to $r = ExA$ even in the benchmark model (compare the discussion in Section 3), whereas $r = ExA$ is welfare superior, for instance, if $v_1 + v_2$ is sufficiently large compared to $v_0$. Therefore, we assume the tie-breaking rule $t$.

35 The Office of Fair Trading (2010, p. 29) reports that “the most common form of online price targeting is to offer vouchers or discounts to Internet users based on their online behavior.”

36 Recall that in case of an ex ante registration requirement, the price is observed by consumers only after they have registered.

37 In the baseline model the firm would only use discounts in case of $k > 0$ (0) to make some of the consumers register. When consumers with discounts decide on registration, they anticipate that all consumers who would actually register must have been offered a discount so that their expected surplus remains unchanged.

38 This ranking follows from Assumption 1 and is similar to the ranking $p(k) < p(0) < p(k^*) + k$. For details, see the proof of Proposition 5.

39 The optimal choice of $d$ is such that high-cost types are just willing to register (such that $12d$ holds with equality); because of the price distortion effect, the firm will not increase the discount any further. Since $p_r$ depends on the share $\delta$ of consumers with discount, $d$ can be expressed as a continuous function of $\delta$. Note that the discount $d(\delta)$ is necessary to induce high-cost types to register in $\delta$ since the price $p_r$ also increases in $\delta$. The more consumers get a discount, the stronger is the price increase, and the higher must be the discount to make a high-cost consumer willing to register.

40 Strictly speaking, if all consumers already register in period $t$, the firm is indifferent between $r_{t+1} = G$ and $r_{t+1} = ExA$. With a continuum of consumers, if a single consumer deviates in period $t$ and does not register, he has mass zero from the point of view of the firm; thus, the firm may still choose $r_{t+1} = ExA$. With a finite (but possibly very large) number of consumers, this no longer holds and a consumer who does not register in period $t$ can (correctly) anticipate that the firm will choose $r_{t+1} = G$. Therefore, we assume the tie-breaking rule in favor of $r_{t+1} = G$ at this point to guarantee that the range under which ex ante registration requirements are chosen in equilibrium corresponds to the case of a finite number of consumers (and, in case of a continuum of consumers, is robust to small trembles in the number of consumers). This makes it possible to treat the case of a continuum of consumers, which is robust to small trembles in the number of consumers.

41 Intuitively, if the value of consumer information increases to $v_1' + v_2' > v_0 + v_2$, the firm’s profit goes up even if it leaves the price unchanged (equal to $p(k^*, v_0 + v_1)$).

42 For general distributions $F$ no closed form solution for $d$ can be obtained; for a uniform distribution on $[0, 1]$, for instance, we obtain $d(\delta) = (\delta + (1 - \delta)q)/(2(1 - \delta)p)/(\sqrt{k_{\delta/0}(\delta/0) - 1})$ for $k_{\delta/0} \geq 0(0)$. This follows from implicit differentiation and the assumptions on $F$. If $\delta \rightarrow 1$ then $p_r \rightarrow p(0)$ if all registered consumers have a discount, the price in the discount case just increases by the value of the discount such that the net-of-discount price remains unchanged; the discount has no effect. (By the same argument, if all consumers have the same registration costs and only consumers with discount register, then $p_r = p(0) + d$ and there is no effect of offering discounts.)

43 If, with targeting technology $q^*$, $\delta^*$ satisfies the feasibility requirement $(1 - q^*)\delta^* \leq 1 - q$, then $(1 - q^*)\delta^* = (1 - q^*)\delta^*(1 - q^*)/(1 - q^*) \leq 1 - q$; thus $\delta^*$ fulfills the corresponding feasibility requirement with targeting technology $q^*$.

References


