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Chair of Finance and Economics
Prof. Dr. Roman Inderst

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Department of Finance

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Beschreibung: Beschreibung: Beschreibung: Z:\blue.gif Prof. Inderst

Beschreibung: Beschreibung: Beschreibung: Z:\blue.gif Publications

 - Finance

 - Microeconomic Theory

 - Competition/IO

 - Policy Papers/Presentations


ID2: 693 | ID3: | Numr: 6 | Prof: 8

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Competition Policy and Industrial Organization

 

Note:

For applied papers, including German articles on antitrust, see bottom of page.

For policy oriented presentations and talks see separate page.

 

Current Working Papers

 

Refunds as a Metering Device (with G. Tirosh), 2011

 

Calling Circles: Network Competition with Non-Uniform Calling Patterns (with S. Hoernig and T. Valletti), r&r Rand Journal of Economics

 

Selling Service Plans to Customers with Differential Information (with M. Peitz), 2011, r&r Int. Journal of Industrial Organization

 

Large Buyer Discounts or Premium? (with J. Montez), 2011 (new version coming soon)

 

Wholesale Price Determination under the Threat of Demand-Side Substitution (with Greg Shaffer), 2011

 

Network Investment, Access and Competition (with M. Peitz), 2011

 

 

Published Papers

 

Incentives for Input Foreclosure

(with T. Valletti), European Economic Review, 2011, 55(6), 820–831

 

Buyer Power and the “Waterbed Effect”

(with T. Valletti), Journal of Industrial Economics, 2011, 59(1), 1-20

 

Countervailing Power and Dynamic Efficiency

(with C. Wey), Journal of the European Economic Association, 2011, 9(4), 702-720

"The presence of fewer but larger buyers can keep a supplier on its toes and, thereby, increase incentives to invest in greater efficiency." 

 

Market-Share Contracts as Facilitating Practices

(with G. Shaffer), Rand Journal of Economics, 2010, 41(4), 709–729

 

Models of Vertical Market Relations

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2010, 28(4), 341-344

 

Third-Degree Price Discrimination with Buyer Power

(with T. Valletti), The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2009, 9(1), Article 6

Market Power, Price Discrimination, and Allocative Efficiency in Intermediate-Goods Markets

(with G. Shaffer), Rand Journal of Economics, 2009, 40(4), 658-672

Indirect vs. Direct Constraints in Markets with Vertical Integration

(with T. Valletti), Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2009, 111(3), 527-546

Price Discrimination in Input Markets

(with T. Valletti), Rand Journal of Economics, 2009, 40(1), 1-19

"Price discrimination in intermediary markets is revisited. In contrast to most existing approaches we allow for demand-side substitution instead of considering a pure monopoly. This reverses most of the predictions on prices and welfare from the extant literature, both in the short and in the long run."

 

Durable Goods with Quality Differentiation

Economics Letters, 2008,100(2), 173-177

 

Cooperative Arrangements in Industrial Organization: Models and Applications

(with J. S. Gans), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2007, 25(5), 879-883

 

Leveraging Buyer Power

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2007, 25(5), 908-924

 

Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives

(with C. Wey), European Economic Review, 2007, 51(3), 647-667

”Two sources of buyer power are identified, one relating to production technologies and one relating to conditions of downstream demand. According to the second source, a buyer’s fraction of the national retail market accounts for his bargaining power. Size may, however, stimulate investment in product and process innovation to shore up bargaining power.”

 

Retail Mergers, Buyer Power, and Product Variety

(with G. Shaffer), The Economic Journal, 2007, 117(1), 45-67

”Mergers across non-overlapping markets may make strategic delisting more likely. The resulting loss in variety is amplified by suppliers’ product repositioning”

 

Shopping Hours and Price Competition

(with A. Irmen), European Economic Review,  2005, 49(5), 1105-1124

”Shopping hours flexibility may add an additional degree of differentiation. Retail prices may go up (above what is justified by higher costs of operating stores).”

 

The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

(with C. Wey), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2004, 22(8-9), 1067-1089

”A parsimonious, auction-based model of endogenous merger formation is developed which allows for nuanced predictions on the likelihood of further concentration as a function of a simple index. Also a full characterization of the linear Bertrand and Cournot model with heterogeneous products is derived.”

 

Bargaining, Mergers and Technology Choice

(with C. Wey), Rand Journal of Economics, 2003, 34(1), 1-19

”A new (contingent-contracting based) approach to model negotiations in bilateral oligopolies is developed, which is shown to endogenize the Shapley value. The approach is then explored to study endogenous market structure and upstream technology choice.”

 

Competitive Search Markets for Durable Goods

(with H. Müller), Economic Theory, 2002, 19(3), 599-622

 

Why Competition May Drive Up Prices

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2002, 47(4), 451-462

 

 

Articles and Book Chapters on Applied Competition Economics

(English and German. For presentations see separate page.)

 

Netzzugang, Wettbewerb und Investitionen (mit M. Peitz) (Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, 2011, Discussion Paper No. 11-025)

 

Investitionen in Next-Generation-Access-Netze: Zugangsverträge und Regulierung (mit J. Kühling, K. H. Neumann und M. Peitz) (Wirtschaftsdienst, 2011, 91(6), 406-413)

 

Effekte verschiedener Rabattformen – Überlegungen zu einem ökonomisch fundierten Ansatz (mit U. Schwalbe) (12.03.2009, Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht, Heft 01, 65-84)

 

Incentives to Foreclose: Comments on the New Guidelines (with T. Valletti, 2008), in Competition Policy International
(final version available here)

 

Buyer Power in Distribution (with N. Mazzarotto, chapter for the ABA Antitrust Section Handbook, Issues in Competition Law)

 

The Role of Buyer Power in Merger Control (with G. Shafer, chapter for the ABA Antitrust Section Handbook, Issues in Competition Law)

 

Where Buying and Selling Power Come Together: The Waterbed Effect (with P. Dobson, Wisconsin Law Review,  2008, Number 2, Issue2, Page 331-357)

 

Die Ökonomische Analyse von Nachfragemacht in der Wettbewerbspolitik (08.12. 2008, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, Heft 12, 1261-1272)

 

Differential Buyer Power and the Waterbed Effect: Do Strong Buyers Benefit or Harm Consumers? (with P. Dobson, ECLR 2007)

 

Market Analysis in the Presence of Indirect Constraints and Captive Sales (with T. Valletti, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2007)

 

Marktabgrenzung und Marktanalyse für Märkte der Vorleistungsebene (mit A. Schwartz) (05.06. 2008, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, Heft 06, 637-646)

 

Engpassmanagement im deutschen Stromübertragungsnetz (mit A. Wambach) (Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft,  2007, 31 (Heft 04),  333-342)

 

Konzentrations – "Plus" im Einzelhandel – aber Verbraucher nicht automatisch im Nachteil (DIW Wochenbericht,  2007, Nr. 41, 597-600)

 

Die Wettbewerbsanalyse von Nachfragemacht aus verhandlungstheoretischer Sicht (mit C. Wey) (DIW Research Notes, 2007; in Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 2008)

 

Some Economics on the Treatment of Buyer Power in Antitrust (with C. Doyle, ECLR 2006)

 

A Tale of Two Constraints: Assessing Market Power in Wholesale Markets (with T. Valletti, ECLR 2006)