Published Papers
Incentives for Input Foreclosure
(with T. Valletti), European Economic
Review, 2011, 55(6), 820–831
Buyer Power and the
“Waterbed Effect”
(with T. Valletti),
Journal of Industrial Economics, 2011, 59(1), 1-20
Countervailing Power and
Dynamic Efficiency
(with C.
Wey), Journal of the European Economic Association, 2011, 9(4), 702-720
"The
presence of fewer but larger buyers can keep a supplier on its toes
and, thereby, increase incentives to invest in greater
efficiency."
Market-Share Contracts as
Facilitating Practices
(with G.
Shaffer), Rand Journal of Economics, 2010, 41(4), 709–729
Models of Vertical Market Relations
International
Journal of Industrial Organization, 2010, 28(4), 341-344
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Third-Degree Price Discrimination with Buyer
Power
(with T. Valletti), The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis
& Policy, 2009, 9(1), Article 6
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Market
Power, Price Discrimination, and Allocative
Efficiency in Intermediate-Goods Markets
(with G. Shaffer), Rand
Journal of Economics, 2009, 40(4), 658-672
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Indirect vs.
Direct Constraints in Markets with Vertical Integration
(with T. Valletti), Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2009,
111(3), 527-546
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Price Discrimination in
Input Markets
(with T. Valletti), Rand Journal of Economics, 2009, 40(1),
1-19
"Price
discrimination in intermediary markets is revisited. In contrast to most
existing approaches we allow for demand-side substitution instead of
considering a pure monopoly. This reverses most of the predictions on
prices and welfare from the extant literature, both in the short and in
the long run."
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Durable Goods
with Quality Differentiation
Economics Letters, 2008,100(2), 173-177
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Cooperative Arrangements
in Industrial Organization: Models and Applications
(with J. S. Gans), International
Journal of Industrial Organization, 2007, 25(5), 879-883
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Leveraging Buyer Power
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2007, 25(5),
908-924
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Buyer Power and Supplier
Incentives
(with C.
Wey), European Economic Review, 2007, 51(3), 647-667
”Two sources
of buyer power are identified, one relating to production technologies
and one relating to conditions of downstream demand. According to the
second source, a buyer’s fraction of the national retail market
accounts for his bargaining power. Size may, however, stimulate
investment in product and process innovation to shore up bargaining
power.”
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Retail Mergers, Buyer
Power, and Product Variety
(with G.
Shaffer), The Economic Journal, 2007, 117(1), 45-67
”Mergers
across non-overlapping markets may make strategic delisting more
likely. The resulting loss in variety is amplified by suppliers’
product repositioning”
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Shopping Hours
and Price Competition
(with A. Irmen), European Economic Review, 2005,
49(5), 1105-1124
”Shopping hours flexibility may add an additional degree of
differentiation. Retail prices may go up (above what is justified by
higher costs of operating stores).”
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The Incentives
for Takeover in Oligopoly
(with C.
Wey), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2004, 22(8-9),
1067-1089
”A
parsimonious, auction-based model of endogenous merger formation is
developed which allows for nuanced predictions on the likelihood of
further concentration as a function of a simple index. Also a full
characterization of the linear Bertrand and Cournot
model with heterogeneous products is derived.”
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Bargaining, Mergers and
Technology Choice
(with C.
Wey), Rand Journal of Economics, 2003, 34(1), 1-19
”A new
(contingent-contracting based) approach to model negotiations in
bilateral oligopolies is developed, which is shown to endogenize the Shapley value. The approach is then
explored to study endogenous market structure and upstream technology
choice.”
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Competitive Search Markets for Durable Goods
(with H. Müller),
Economic Theory, 2002, 19(3), 599-622
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Why Competition May Drive Up Prices
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
2002, 47(4), 451-462
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Articles and Book Chapters on Applied Competition Economics
(English and German.
For presentations see separate page.)
Netzzugang, Wettbewerb und Investitionen (mit M. Peitz) (Zentrum für Europäische
Wirtschaftsforschung, 2011, Discussion Paper No. 11-025)
Investitionen in Next-Generation-Access-Netze:
Zugangsverträge und Regulierung (mit
J. Kühling, K. H. Neumann und M. Peitz)
(Wirtschaftsdienst, 2011, 91(6), 406-413)
Effekte verschiedener Rabattformen – Überlegungen zu
einem ökonomisch fundierten Ansatz (mit U.
Schwalbe) (12.03.2009, Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht, Heft 01, 65-84)
Incentives to
Foreclose: Comments on the New Guidelines (with T. Valletti,
2008), in Competition Policy International
(final version available here)
Buyer Power in
Distribution (with N. Mazzarotto, chapter for the ABA Antitrust Section
Handbook, Issues in Competition Law)
The Role of
Buyer Power in Merger Control (with G. Shafer, chapter for the ABA Antitrust Section Handbook,
Issues in Competition Law)
Where Buying and
Selling Power Come Together: The Waterbed Effect (with P. Dobson, Wisconsin Law Review,
2008, Number 2, Issue2, Page 331-357)
Die Ökonomische Analyse von Nachfragemacht in der
Wettbewerbspolitik (08.12. 2008, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, Heft 12, 1261-1272)
Differential
Buyer Power and the Waterbed Effect: Do Strong Buyers Benefit or Harm
Consumers? (with P.
Dobson, ECLR 2007)
Market Analysis in
the Presence of Indirect Constraints and Captive Sales (with T. Valletti,
Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2007)
Marktabgrenzung und Marktanalyse für Märkte der
Vorleistungsebene (mit A.
Schwartz) (05.06. 2008, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, Heft 06, 637-646)
Engpassmanagement im deutschen
Stromübertragungsnetz (mit A. Wambach) (Zeitschrift für
Energiewirtschaft, 2007, 31 (Heft 04), 333-342)
Konzentrations – "Plus" im Einzelhandel – aber
Verbraucher nicht automatisch im Nachteil (DIW Wochenbericht, 2007, Nr. 41,
597-600)
Die Wettbewerbsanalyse von Nachfragemacht aus
verhandlungstheoretischer Sicht (mit C. Wey) (DIW Research Notes, 2007; in Perspektiven der
Wirtschaftspolitik, 2008)
Some Economics
on the Treatment of Buyer Power in Antitrust (with C. Doyle, ECLR 2006)
A Tale of Two Constraints: Assessing Market Power
in Wholesale Markets (with T. Valletti, ECLR 2006)
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