|
Financial Advice and Stock Market Participation (with D. Georgarakos), 2011
Sales Talk, Cancellation Terms,
and the Role of Consumer Protection (with M. Ottaviani),
revise and resubmit Review of Economic Studies
On
the Optimal Use of “Dirt Taxes” and Credit Subsidies in the Presence of
Private Financing Constraints (with F. Hoffmann and U. Moslener),
2011
Why
Employment Agreements Favour those at the Top, 2011
Financial Advice (with M. Ottaviani), requested from
Journal of Economic Literature
Publications
|
Presale Information
(with Florian Hoffmann), Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, 146(6),
2333-2355
Competition through Commissions and Kickbacks (with M. Ottaviani), forthcoming in American Economic
Review
|
|
Misselling (Financial)
Products: The Limits for Internal Compliance, Economics Letters, 2010, 106(1), 35-37
Innovation Management in
Organizations, European Economic Review,
2009, 53(8), 871-887
|
|
Misselling
Through Agents (with M. Ottaviani),
American Economic Review, 2009, 99(3), 883-908
|
|
Dynamic Bilateral
Bargaining under Private Information with a Sequence of Potential
Buyers, Review of Economic
Dynamics, 2008, 11(1), 220-236
“As a building block for decentralized markets with private
information, the paper solves the bargaining problem with a seller
facing the random entry of privately informed buyers. Conditions for when
the Coase Conjecture holds or not are
derived.”
|
|
Single Sourcing vs. Multiple Sourcing, Rand Journal of Economics, 2008,
39(1), 199-213
”The optimal organization of procurement activity, as a decision
between single or multiple sourcing, is derived as a function of
bargaining power and size. The key feature of the model, namely that
there are several (potential) suppliers who have also other channels of
distribution, is shown to qualify existing results.”
|
|
Distributional Conflict in Organizations (with H. Müller and K. Warneryd), European Economic Review, 2007, 51(2),
385-402
”Based solely on a model of
internal influence activities, predictions are made on whether
particular organizational forms, such as U vs. M, are optimal and under
what circumstances.”
|
|
Bargaining with a Possibly Committed Seller, Review of Economic Dynamics, 2005, 8(4),
927-944
”A buyer with private information about his valuation negotiates
with a seller who can but need not be committed to the advertised price
(as he could be the principal or only an agent). A key result is the
characterization of the non-stationary hazard rate of gradual
concessions.”
|
|
Influence Costs and
Hierarchy (with H. Müller and K. Warneryd),
Economics of Governance, 2005, 6(2), 177-197
“The optimal design of an hierarchy
is derived under the aspect of minimizing distortions and losses due to
(costly) internal influence activities.”
|
|
Competitive
Search Markets with Heterogeneous Workers, European Economic Review, 2005, 49(5),
1525-1542
”Competitive (direct)
search markets with bilateral heterogeneity and private information are
considered here for the first time. Implications for skill-wage differentials are derived.”
|
|
Matching Markets with Adverse Selection, Journal of Economic Theory, 2005,
121(2), 145-166
"In decentralized markets with continuous entry and exit
also the distribution of agent types is an endogenous variable, next to
contracts. The interplay of contracts and the distribution selects the
Least-Cost-Separating outcome, irrespective of the distribution of
types among entrants.”
|
|
Contractual Distortions in a (Labor) Market
with Frictions, Journal
of Economic Theory, 2004, 116(1), 155-176
”Whether and how contractual distortions (due to screening)
disappear as frictions in a decentralized market vanish depends on
whether they are due to impatience or due to (linear) search costs.
Also the possibility of multiple equilibria
is explored.”
Alternating-Offer Bargaining over Contracts
under Incomplete Information, Economic Theory 2003, 22(3), 419-429
“This paper considers an open-time horizon model of bilateral
negotiations with i) one privately informed
agent and ii) an additional screening variable. The key result is a
characterization of conditions for when efficiency, including no delay,
is the unique PBE.”
|
|
Contractual Signaling in a Market Environment, Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, 40(1),
77-98
“It is shown that the possibility to contract with someone else
in a market setting has substantial refinement power.”
|
|
Capacity Constrained
Firms in (Labor) Markets with Adverse Selection (with A. Wambach),
Economic Theory, 2002, 19(3),
525-548
”Building on EER 2001, the existence result is extended to uniqueness,
albeit now in a labor-market setting.”
|
|
Contract Design and Bargaining Power, Economics Letters, 2002, 74(2), 171-176
”As the agent in a standard principal-agent relationship obtaines increasingly more bargaining power,
contractual inefficiencies are gradually reduced.”
Competitive Insurance Markets under Adverse
Selection and Capacity Constraints (with A. Wambach), European Economic Review, 2001,
45(10), 1981 -1992
The Non-Existence Problem of Rothschild-Stiglitz
is (simply) overcome by introducing capacity constraints as this endogenizes the distribution of types at deviating
(and supposedly pooling) offers.”
|
|
Screening in a Matching Market, Review of Economic Studies, 2001, 68(4),
849-868
”The paper embeds the most simple private-value agency
problem in a matching market with bilateral meetings and random choice
of the proposer. The key effect of this is to endogenize
(type-dependent) reservation values for the agent, depending on market fundamentals.”
|
|
Incentive Schemes as a Signaling Device, Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 2001, 44(4), 455-465
“Optimal contract design by an informed principal. A trade-off
between signaling good information and providing an agent with high-powered
incentives is derived and studied in an application.”
Multi-Issue Bargaining with Endogenous
Agenda, Games and
Economic Behavior, 2000, 30(1), 64-82
”This is the first paper to study endogenous agenda formation
over multiple issues. Depending on the nature of individual bargaining
frontiers, there may be divergent preferences over sequential and
simultaneous negotiations.”
Other Publications
(Note: For presentations on consumer protection
see the page “Presentations”)
Consumer Protection and the Role of Advice in the
Market for Retail Financial Services
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2011,
167(1), 4-21
Consumer
Protection in Markets with Advice (with M. Ottaviani),
Competition Policy International, 2011, 6(1), 47-64
Retail Finance: Thoughts
on Reshaping Regulation and Consumer Protection after the Financial
Crisis,
European Business Organization Law Review, 2009, 10, 455-464
|
|
