Faculty of Economics and Business Administration Publications Database

Best-Reply Matching in Games

Droste, Edward
Voorneveld, Mark
Volume: 46
Number: 3
Pages: 291 - 309
Month: December
ISSN-Print: 0165-4896
Link External Source: Online Version
Year: 2003
Keywords: Best Reply; Game Theory; Bounded Rationality; Equilibrium; Matching
Abstract: We study a new equilibrium concept in non-cooperative games, where players follow a behavioral rule called best-replymatching. Under this rule a player matches the probability of playing a pure strategy to the probability that this strategy is a bestreply. Kosfeld, Droste, and Voorneveld [Games and Economic Behavior 40 (2002) 270] show that best-replymatching equilibria are stationary states in a simple model of social learning, where newborns adopt a best-reply to recent observations of play. In this paper we analyze best-replymatching in more detail and illustrate the concept by means of well-known examples. For example in the centipede game it is shown that players will continue with large probability.